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Review

# State-economy relations and survival of democratic governance in transiting societies: Lessons from South Korea

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Rational men support institutions that best guarantee the attainment of their socioeconomic aspirations. Of all known political rationalizations, democracy, it is that best prides such. However, in certain climes, there are inhibitive factors defiling the success of democracy, much of which is located within the state-economy relations. With a state-economy relations and democratic governance model, this paper comparatively, examined the trajectories of development in transiting societies in Asia and sub-Sahara Africa. It unveils that much of the failure at ensuring sustenance of democratic governance across transiting societies, in this case Nigeria, as compared with South Korea, stem from the contradictions arising from the interface between the state and the economy. With the Korean insight, despite regional peculiarities, it insists that efforts at reprofiling the state to ensure sustenance of democratic order should be premised on appropriate framework that captures the various indexes and promotes mutually reinforcing positive synergy between the state and the economy.

**Key words:** State, state-economy relations, democratic governance, transiting societies, Nigeria, South Korea, Africa and Asia.

## INTRODUCTION

Marxian history of social development teaches that rational men only support government that fulfills the conditions for their continued existence. Man, to Samuelson (1980) is homoeconomicus (Ogunmodede, 1986). Economic interests and loyalty come first and permeate all his thoughts, outlooks, interests and activities. His first loyalty, however veiled, is to his economic interest; and his second loyalty will be given to any or institution which serves to promote those interests

(Awolowo, 1978). To Osaghae (1994), the extent, therefore, to which a political regime serves the interest of its subjects determines their preference for support or withdrawal.

Democracy, as of today, offers the greatest prospect despite the various charges of weakness. It is yet "the least objectionable" form of government (Appadorai, 1968). Quoting Cavour, Appadorai noted "things may be bad today but they were worst yesterday... However

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grave the indictment that may be brought against democracy, its friends can answer 'what better alternative do you offer' (Ibid). However, despite the global clamour for democracy (Fawole, 1994; Onovo, 1997; El-Baz, 2005; Anon, 2006), it is observed that there are inhibitive factors that have, and may still, condition its failure in certain political systems.

Adopting comparative analysis, this paper examined the trajectory of socioeconomic and democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia with the choice of Nigeria and South Korea, both being postcolonial states, as case studies. South Korea, like Nigeria four decades ago, was typically a less-developed country with an average per-capita income of US\$100 (Lau, 1990; Mimiko, 1999), and a GDP of US\$3,810m, while Nigeria had US\$3,150m. In the modern epoch, both have experienced close to three decades of military authoritarianism with reported cases of corruption. Compared to Nigeria's 923,768km, Korea suffered serious territorial limitations- 98477 sq km. Also, it seems only ethnic diversity manifestly differentiates the two countries with Nigeria having well over 250 ethnic groups while South Korea has a small Chinese minority among her population. On religion however, South Korea is indeed more heterogeneous than Nigeria, having adherents of Christianity, Buddhism, Shamanism, Confucianism and Chondogya.

Nevertheless, today, there is a gulf of difference between South Korea and Nigeria socially, economically, technologically, industrially and increasingly, politically. This fact remains incontrovertible with the mass of evidence to that effect (Lall, 1993; Nelson and Park, 1998; Lau, 1990; Mimiko, 1999; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2001; Mody, 1999). If the Nigerian and African situation must change for better, the first thing to do is to embrace the advice by Datt and Ravallion (1996) that:

*A key to sound development ... may lie in understanding why some economies have performed so much better than others in escaping absolute poverty.*

It is against this backdrop that this article unveils many of the factors accounting for world acclaimed socioeconomic development and sustenance of democratic order in South Korea as against the failure of similar orders in Nigeria. It traced the Nigerian failure to socioeconomic maladjustments inherent in the state-economy relations. To achieve better results in socioeconomic development and sustenance of democratic order, this paper, with elaborate indexing, attempts profiling relevant state-economy relations and democratic governance model considered appropriate for promotion of economic development and sustenance of democratic governance. It insists that except genuine effort is made to ensure positive mutual reinforcement of the state-economy nexus, sustenance of democracy or any regime for that matter will remain a pipe-dream in troubled transiting

societies.

## A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Many of the problems inducing political and democratic instability in the less-developed countries can be traced to socioeconomic and developmental failure that is very endemic in Africa (Zehender, 1990). Anstee (1990) in explaining the 'malaise of Sub-Sahara Africa', submitted that "perhaps the term 'crisis' is often used too quickly, but the depressing living conditions prevailing in many Third World countries at the present time do not appear to permit another description". To Anstee, crisis of development is particularly pronounced in sub-Sahara Africa, as countries in this part of the world show marked differences in political systems, in natural endowments of raw materials, in their socio-cultural frameworks and in their economic order. Writing further, he concluded, "with only a few exceptions, however, they show similar symptoms of crisis".

Reviewing some of the factors causing developmental failures, Streeten (1969) identified and grouped such under six categories- output and income, conditions of production, levels of living, attitude to work and life, institutions and policies. To Streeten, these are conditions that are casually interrelated, in the sense that a change in one condition will cause changes in some or all other and properly forms the component of state-economy relations. In societies where state-economy relations are not well resolved, and therefore constituting inhibitive factors, sustenance of economically failing state and democracy stands a tall order.

The hope for continued harmonious subsistence of such transiting polities requires that those at the helm of affairs, the political leadership, which is a nodal factor of the state-economy nexus, fashion out programmes that will mitigate the increasing exacerbation of the divisive and restive tendencies among the people. No doubt, one best way of achieving this is to see that fundamental attributes and desires of the people are generally constantly respected. In particular, the socioeconomic well-being of the people should be one of the major undisguised goals of government and governance. It is incontrovertible that except the political arrangement makes it possible for people to meet their socioeconomic needs without any form of perceived or manifest inequity, prolonged injustice, undisguised discrimination and chronic interclass subjugation, it will fail to command the much needed social capital. And, where such indispensable value such as unanimous nationwide loyalty and patriotic commitment of the people to nation-building is lacking, development cannot be achieved. And in such climes, mass defense of democratic institutions will become an uphill task. This is more so in heterogeneous societies and states more often than not characterized by centrifugal tendencies.

It is to be realized that democracy thrives on national loyalty and selfless commitment of the citizens. This ideal, which forms the pillar of democratic sustainability, can only be attained where the philosophical underpinning of the state is positively developmental and based on the ideals of mutual existence and satisfaction of the leaders and the led. Attainment of widespread development and sustenance of democratic governance is clearly impossible in a system that is heavily weighted in favour of corrupt ruling elites to the detriment of the survival of the citizens. In underdeveloped societies suffering from negative state-economy relations, sustenance of democratic rule stands a tall order. The way out of impending instability, therefore, lies in properly profiling state-economy relations to attune it to the exigencies of mass development. How best to pursue this goal serves the central focus of this piece. The conviction is shared that:

Political stability, whether in democracy or quasi democracy, could not be pursued for its own sake. In the circumstances of developing countries, what was [and still] more important [is] good government that responds positively to the demands and expectations of the people (Osaghae, 1994).

To Osaghae, only a government that performs well can be stable, if what sustains it in power is voluntary support or consent of the citizens. Generally speaking, therefore, the reasons why people may be interested in politics or why they may decide to support, oppose, or be passive to the business of government, in trial democracies as we have in transiting societies, are tied to the stakes or returns they expect from it. As of now, there is so much failing in this regard.

Much of the vices (Akindele, 1995) responsible for truncation of previous attempts at democratic governance still manifest across present transiting societies. African democracies are still ridden by electoral fraud, political self-aggrandizement, state-facilitated socioeconomic corruption, poverty-induced social polarization and bitterness. In all of these, the place of leadership as an important index of state is not lost. Ideally, as an impartial and committed moderator of social milieu, Muganda (1997), in *Mobilizing quietly for impact...* stated:

*Public leadership simply means members of the public through their established system have entrusted on their leaders the thrust and responsibility of managing public affairs –both political and administrative discharging their duties impartially and faithfully with public weal in mind.*

Muganda (1997) expects that “the establishment of a system of integrity and the requirement that it be mandatorily observed by leaders” will spur the emerging leadership of the new democratic order to make bold moves towards eradication of socio-economic vices. Leadership indiscretion, corruption and pronounced distributive inequity that have in the past been major obstacles

to attainment of development and sustenance of democratic governance will continue to pose as potent barriers to attainment of order in developing societies.

In a recent work ‘Beyond the State: Nigeria’s Search for Positive Leadership’ analysts have revealed that post independence experience with politics and regimes up to the current Fourth Republic have largely been a perverted one in which leadership preoccupation in power has been “prevarication of truth, and self-seeking politics of frills and window-dressing” (Olukoshi Et al., 2005). Giving the negative characterization of most developing states in Africa, democracy, devoid of its constitutive economic values, despite its other lofty promises, remains threatened.

Ensuring sustenance therefore requires a state that is constructively developmental in terms of genuine leadership commitment to and mobilization for development. Democratic sustenance will not be possible in any system that is manifestly corrupt and parasitically distributive. Such can only inevitably end-up discrediting any political paradigm it adopts, democracy inclusive. Except the right values prevail and genuine effort is made to frame development-oriented state-economy relations that assures people-centered socioeconomic policies and programmes, citizens will remain disenchanting with government and governance. The result for Africa will be inducing another round of systemic instability across transiting nations.

### **Historicity of circumstantial and preventable failures of democracy: the case of Nigeria**

Failure of democracy has been well documented across history and climes (Benes, 1939 cited in Appadorai et al., 1997; Abubakar, 1998; Diamond, 2002). Apart from indictment relating to slowness and inefficiency of some democratic methods and leadership, the high degree of partiality, corruption and incapacity of bureaucracy and other government machineries subjugated very often to the exaggerated party spirit have been observed. Across trial democracies, undue facilitation of party interests leads to situations in which ideal and appropriate sanctions are negotiated away in the spirit of partisan politics and party interest.

Not borrowing, as expected, from the successful models of the developed democracies, many of the avoidable ills of socioeconomic and political mismanagement that defiled past experiences are still the defining realities of many subsisting trial democracies in transiting African societies. Despite its oddities, these manifest abuses in pseudo-democracies have been major causes persuading frustrated mass of the people, to still see autocracy and armed struggle as worthy interludes to free society from socioeconomic and political woes committed by principal stakeholders in the so-called democratic regimes. The direct consequence of



the above, from experience, has been that people over-time have had course to eulogize autocracy recounting its achievements in places like Spain, Portugal of the past and in the recent history, South Korea and other Asian tigers. Therefore, rather than merely wishing away the possibility of failure of dysfunctional democracies wherever it persists, the earlier it is realized the better that it is the worrisome conducts of the ruling class and frustrated expectations that have, in the past decades, been swinging the pendulum from democracy to autocracy. The logical result has been the increasing systemic instability in some African countries as observed in the recent years.

Even though the fortune of these dramatic changes from disappointing trial democracies to authoritarian order last only for a short time, the authoritarian interludes, though itself abnormal when they occur, provide a break in civilian malady, and relief for people that have met disappointment in democracy. Where luck obtains, though this is very rare particularly in Africa, some autocratic leaders have instituted changes that are conducive to gestation of ideal democratic order. The examples of Ghana and South Korea are exceptionally good ones.

The focus in this paper, however, is not to discredit democracy but to itemize instances in which efforts towards its sustenance can become discredited and unsustainable. It is the belief that the realization by all stakeholders of possible failure of democratic trials will help to inspire those in positions of authority to begin to seek, within the purview of development-prone state-economy relations, ways of avoiding many of the pitfalls that currently undermines socioeconomic development and sustenance of inchoate democracies in transiting African societies.

### ***A focus on Nigerian democratic history in the reflections of other transiting societies***

Writing on some of the factors inhibiting attainment of development and sustenance of democratic governance in Nigeria, scholars have attested to cultural variegation (Isichei, 1977; Suberu, 1998; Osarhieme, 1998; Tamuno, 1998; Otite, 1973; Osaghae, 1999; Easterly, 2000). Others have pinpointed political asymmetry and dis-aggregative federal structures (Osuntokun, 1979; Ayoade, 1997). From economic point of view, analysts (Onyeoziri, 1984; Shehu, 1994; Lewis, 1994; Joseph, 1991, 1999; El-Rufai, 2005; Agbaje, 2004, 2011) have identified elitist conspiracy and corruption, laying of false foundation for economic development, mono-economy, etc as banes of socio-political development. Hence, effort is required towards unveiling an appropriate framework for overcoming many of these multifaceted and inter-woven challenges.

Just as it has been experienced in some other African countries, Nigeria has experienced three democratic

dispensations. The First Republic, which ran from October 1<sup>st</sup> 1960 to January 15<sup>th</sup> 1966, was terminated due to avoidable lapses on the part of its operators- the immediate post-independence Nigerian leadership. With the exception of a few, the bulk of the leadership of that era was not only adjudged as incompetent, unfocused and deficient in terms of economic and developmental planning, some of its anchormen were alleged to be corrupt (Huntington, 1968). The Second Republic equally came to an end on the account of the same misdeeds, even at a greater dimension (Achebe, 1981; Akinsanya, 1987; Semenitari, 2005; Obasanjo, 2005).

The ugly experience of the failed Second Republic almost eternally discredit democracy in Nigeria as people rolled out drums to welcome the military as an end of the year gift to the nation, and a source of hope in the coming year when they decided to intervene on the New Year Eve- 31<sup>st</sup> of December 1983. The third democratic experiment, after spending billions of Naira on the longest and the most expensive democratic transition ever witnessed in Nigerian and African history, came to an end also on the same account of grand socioeconomic and political corruption (Diamond et al., 1997). Even against the military regime that superintended its birth, to put an end to the ill-fated Third Republic, as it will happen also to any irresponsible democratic regime, the high waves of socioeconomic and political dissatisfaction forced the people to resort to all manner of tactics, though unconventionally, to ensure the downfall. This widespread discontentment was not seen in the pseudo civilian interim and military extensions of the republic. They all fell into the pity of history dug the angry citizens. This insurgence by the civil populace and civil society organizations (Abutudu 1995) was contemplated and determinedly hatched irrespective of the negative effects that such anarchic and temporary instability may have on the State and the system. The belief then was that no sacrifice and effort was considered too much to free the society from the leadership-induced strangulation of Nigeria and Nigerians.

It is true that the military from historical evidences has never been a better alternative to civil governance. It is also instructive that where democracy failed to discharge its *raison d'être* of combating corruption and making people comfortable in the shortest possible time, the hurting shadows of past frustrated expectations across transiting societies in Africa remain fertile ground for full blown military and pseudo-military armed insurgencies. Just as it has been across African history, "the indiscipline of the political class manifested in intra- and inter-party squabbles, corruption, economic mismanagement provided the Nigerian military the opportunity to terminate the second republic in December 1983" (Abubakar, 1998). Democratic delinquencies arising from the cumulative effects of the mismanagement of national socioeconomic and political affairs by African political class have often resulted into assemblage of woes

(Diamond, 1995 cited by Osha, 1998). Across Africa generally, and Nigerian in particular, there has been great lag in institutional capacity, flexibility and legitimacy. Socioeconomic problem is ever-mounting. Problems are increasing due to state corruption and ineptitude, just as proliferation of crime and violence is fast contributing to the withering of state authority. More and more of the people now prefer abandoning the state while retreating into informal arenas. The delinquent state performance has resulted into political and national wealth becoming monopolized by an increasingly narrow elite and mass constituencies becoming more and more alienated, angry and embittered. "Every type of institutional glue that binds diverse cultures, regions, classes and factions together into a common national framework gradually disintegrates" (Diamond, 1995 cited by Osha, 1998).

From immediate post independence to the present, Africa generally, and Nigeria in particular, has continued to witness bad tastes in democratic trials. The nature and the effects of the socioeconomic errors committed even in democracy by the political class remain very potent in the explanation of democratic summersaults across Africa. Not borrowing from the wisdom of earlier criticism (Maloney, 1965), avoidable political mistakes and wanton corruption occasioned by economic parasitism, perpetrated through the activities of over-entrenched and selfish ruling class have made nonsense of the opportunities (Agbaje et al., 2004). The resources and dispensations that the rest of the world leaders used to bail their nations and continent out of political uncertainty and economic penury have been corruptly expended by African and Nigerian leaders (Ezeife, 1995; Nwabueze, 1993; Omoruyi et al., 1994, Diamond, 2002; Ake, 2005; Agbaje, 2004, 2011).

At the onset of the current Nigerian Fourth Republic, reviewing the democratic process in Nigeria of 1979-1983, and intending it to serve as a note of caution for the emergent Fourth Republic politicians and leaders, Diamond (2002) submitted that the failure of the then democratic regime "raises the question of the future of the democratic system. Democracy though alive in Nigeria... has been 'badly wounded... Liberal Democracy in Nigeria is still far from secure". As experienced in the recent time across some Maghreb and central African states, and even presently in Nigeria, the intended lesson has not been learnt as socioeconomic mismanagement and its attendant damages still impact on the citizens' livelihood.

While one is persuaded to want to reason that not only for Nigeria, "poverty reduction is the most difficult challenge facing African people and has remained the greatest obstacle to pursuit of sustainable socioeconomic growth and democratic sustainability". Also, in Obasanjo's words:

*The growing incidence and dynamics of poverty have stratified and polarized African society between the haves*

*and the have-nots, between the north and the south ... The resulting...social conflicts have eroded the fabric that held society together (National Planning Commission, 2004).*

Therefore, "the challenge for most of African states is not only to reform the economy in order to boost economic growth but also to empower the people as a means of revitalizing the weakened social pillar" (National Planning Commission, 2004).

To reveal the criticality of positive and development-inducing state-economy relations to systemic stability, Nikitin (1983), paraphrasing Marx on the fatal consequence of poverty to the continued subsistence of any society, objectively stated "any society will perish if it ceases to produce material wealth; so, as Marx teaches, the production of material wealth is the basis of life and development of any society". Regrettably however, rather than evolving strategies that will ensure development of their nations and people, African states and leaders, with a few exceptions, have failed woefully to commit themselves, and enlist the support of their subjects, towards the attainment of corruption-free socioeconomic development. In most cases, as Nigerian experience teaches, states and leaders have been facilitators of corruption and mass underdevelopment; and these have become major obstacles to sustenance of democratic governance.

Judging from the works of analysts (Sung, 1973; Nelson and Park, 1998; Lau, 1990; Lall, 1993; Mimiko, 1999; Ashoka, 1999; Hart and Burkett, 2001), many of the Asian countries that were also among the least developed as at the time most African countries gained their independence of *great-but-lost-hopes* have by the last decade of the twentieth century, attained transformation and greatness not only eco-technologically over the preceding thirty-five years. They have also rapidly developed from the status of technologically backward and poor nations to that of relatively 'modern and affluent economies', and are on the path to political greatness. This feat was made possible courtesy of pragmatic leadership adopting the '*Right fundamentals*', advantageously reinforcing '*Conducive culture*', allowing positive '*Contagion*', and where necessary pragmatically promoting '*Wrong prices*'. Crediting their roles, Petri (1993) described this developmental process as pragmatic application of neoclassical rhetoric by determined, development-oriented and purposive regimes and leadership. Despite the reluctance of the developed countries to transfer technology (Ake, 1978; Kwanashie, 1988), across these nations, positive investments of resources have generated rapid inventions. South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore that have, more or less, never witnessed political liberalism in the past have not only attained commendable industrial and technological development; but are now on the way to long lasting all-embracing socioeconomic and democratic experience. Even the 7000 islands country –Philippines, upon positive

and all-benefitting state-economy relations, despite great territorial hindrance, prolonged colonialism and authoritarianism, is already on the path of progress. At the end of the twentieth century, Philippines' education and manpower development programme was ranked one of the best in the world.

No doubt, the level of success already attained by those countries seems a testimony of the constructive philosophical foundation upon which state-economy relations is grounded in such regions. This suggests that those countries, unlike their Nigerian counterparts (Olukoshi et al., op cit) in postcolonial era, have states and leaders that pride themselves in high dosage of economic nationalism and, with a mutually reinforcing state-economy relations, are harmoniously united and oriented towards development of their respective nations and people

### **Has democracy a chance of succeeding in African transiting societies as it seems in Asia? Towards a new comparative paradigm –the SERD Model**

Democracy has proved its success in small, big, homogenous and heterogeneous nations. It has blossomed and endured in almost all the developed nations. Surprisingly, however, democracy has failed in most less-developed and poorer regions of the world. Searching for some enabling conditions, indication around the world has been that a correlation exists between economic prosperity and survival of democratic governance. At least, if economic prosperity is not a precursor to democratic success as it has been observed in India and few other places, it is a necessary complement. Inexcusably, it is a popular view that, through its principles of openness, integrity, probity and accountability, democracy should promote economic development (Mc-Quillans in Langseth and Simpkins, 1996). But, advancing economic development, in Thomas view, requires the existence of a state and leadership class that is economically productive, all-embracing and all-caring (Thomas in Langseth and Galt, 1996). This thus suggests a bi-directional causality as against the common place unidirectional notion of democracy-development synergy.

Whereas, experience across Africa on the role of the state in economic management has been pervasively negative, the story is different in other developing regions of the world. Like Nigeria and some African countries, Brazil, South Korea, China, Malaysia, and several others in the 60s fall between the middle-low and middle-high income group, with Nigeria placed in the middle-high, hovering around the same per capita income with South Korea, and sharing other similar indexes of socio-economic and political development. All observed natural limitations of associated with territory and cultural inhibitions such as religion (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 2006) have been able to retard Korea's march towards development. According to Lau (1990),

South Korea four decades ago was typically a less-developed country and comparatively with little potentials for such world-acclaimed astronomical development. But the story has changed for the better.

Unveiling why some economies and democracies have performed so distinctively better than the others remains the exact goal of most comparative studies. On this line, it is here noted that there is however the need to avoid the usual pitfall of mono-factor analysis in favour of a more robust multivariate analysis as captured in Figure 1.

After decades of investigating the Korean miracle, there has been controversies generated by conscious denial of the centrality of the state by 'neoclassical analysts' [who, more often, are interested in crediting 'the market' than its 'fixer'- the state (Mimiko, 1999)] about the world producing an 'unchallenged explanatory paradigm' for unveiling the key factors of such phenomenal development. But much of these controversies have been duly interrogated (Mimiko, 1999). There is a general consensus on the undeniable role of the state in the development of South Korea; thus putting an end to the 'statist-neoclassicist controversy' (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2001). As things now stand, there is a growing need not only to analyze the nature and role of the state across countries and regions in line with the accepted explanation of the 'Asian model' of development, but also to seek ways of applying the proven paradigm towards overcoming the problems of underdevelopment and systemic instability in Nigeria and other transiting societies in Africa.

As hinted above, to fully understand the complexity of the problems confronting transiting societies, as a precursor to making them truly developmental, efforts at reprofiling the state must adopt a multivariate or multi-factorial approach (Figure 1). It is very persuading that through such eclectic, clear understanding and analysis of the problems and factors, a mutually reinforcing state-economy relations capable of enabling comprehensive retooling and re-engineering of transiting states and democracies to make them truly developmental can be meaningfully achieved. To this end, attempt is made to further reveal the centrality of the state and its indexes in explaining state-economy relations that gave rise to the phenomenal development history of South Korea as one of the most successful Asian examples.

### **The 'state' in development discourse**

For a start, the state, as a modal factor in state-economy relations has been subject of passionate analysis, differing nomenclature and statures. To Evans (1997), these changing theoretical perspectives cannot be separated from the real historical changes in the position of the state (Agbaje, 2011). Evans noted, the demand on the state has burgeoned. Across developed countries, demographically driven increases in transfer of payment have resulted in doubling of government expenditures as




Figure 1. State-Economy relations and democratic governance (SERD) model .

a proportion of GDP. Also, in developing countries, the desire for more rapid economic development has produced similar expansion. Thus, given the diverse manifestations of the state over time, scholars have been burdened with the task of ascertaining what exactly the state is or should be. Hinting the widest possible conceptualization of the State, Benjamin and Duvall (1985) have extracted the following from literatures:

1. The state as government by which is meant the collective set of personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in the polity.
2. The state as public bureaucracy or administrative apparatus as a coherent totality and as an institutionalized legal order (see also Krasner 1984)
3. The state as a ruling class.
4. The state as a normative order.

The state is defined, more or less, by historical realities or trajectories of development manifesting as differently as possible and necessary from one epoch to another, and across regions of the world. The state, ideally, and in the broadest possible sense of the word is:

*the institutional representation of the society, in which it is endowed all formal and informal power of the people, intrinsically bonded with the fate of the society and through, and/or about, which the society makes its greatest impressions and/or expressions; and where inherently lies the potential strengths or weaknesses for societal transformation (Agbaje, 2011).*

Regrettably however, for the less-developed countries, lagging development of political and administrative institutions and leadership, as notable subsets of the

state, has resulted in an ominous capacity gap, that has at a time, historically suggested the move towards eclipse of the state in underdeveloped regions.

Whether negative or positive, in whatever manner it manifests, the state is a fundamental factor in social organization. And, reviewing the interface between the state and the economy in engendering socioeconomic and political development across the globe, the centrality of the state and its indexes as independent variable, cannot be overemphasized. In the analysis of the Asian miracle and African failure, using South Korea and Nigeria as case studies, the following indexes of the state have been found to be very instructive in shaping not only economic, but also other facets of socio-political development,

- a. leadership,
- b. enactment and enforcement of law and order
- c. bureaucracy
- d. state capacity and autonomy, and
- e. structure of governance.

As will later be revealed, in all these, and contrary to the Nigerian and African experience, South Korea and other Asian states have received unparalleled commendation across the world. And as such, indexes resulting from such world-acclaimed experiences could be considered credible criteria for emulation by countries desirous of fast development and systemic stability.

Examining the interface between the state and economy in Nigeria, Odife (1985) has noted that governments all over the world have a role in both the development and the operation of the financial systems generally. Citing Ben-Shahar (1972), Odife submit further that even if the capital market in an economy were perfectly competitive, it is by no means certain that economic efficiency could be reached. In fact, in order to achieve economic efficiency, some administrative intervention and regulation by the government is a *sine-qua-non*. Proving further that the problems of development which determine the support for or frustration with and withdrawal from regimes transcends economic, Oghene (1986) observed that some of us think that our present predicament is simply an economic one, but as Kenneth Boulding pointed out:

*a growth is spread all over the activity of a society; part of it is found in family... in educational system... in industrial organization and part in government. There is more than economy that makes a nation [Oghene, 1986; Olopoenia, 1998].*

As revealed in Figure 1, effectiveness of the state in managing economic resources for development remains a fundamental factor for economic survival of a people. These economic variables with which the state interface to engineer rapid development can reasonably be

summarized as: (a) nation's nature and level of natural endowment, (b) nation's drive for and level of industrialization, (c) availability of labour power as well as opportunity for and rate of employment, (d) the nature and level of strategic development planning, and (e) the favourableness of its economic transaction with other nations as well as the general context of external relations at any point in time.

### ***The imperativeness of effective state-economy relations***

To underscore the need for positive and mutually reinforcing state-economy relations, Harris (1980) affirmed that in developing the concept of the state it has first to be recognized that the state is not only a political body, but also has a significant economic aspect. Its branches are themselves economic agent enmeshed in market forces. To Stolper (1963), you cannot make policy without politics. This underscores the indispensable contribution of state and its bureaucratic/administrative machineries to success or otherwise of a nation's developmental effort. Where the state is weak and ineffective, sustainable development will be unattainable. In their study of sub-Saharan Africa, Pickett and Singer (1990), citing Ghana as a case study, have clearly revealed that bad and excessive economic mismanagement by the state is the proximate explanation for poor economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa.

This led Bogner (1969) to assert that there are several difficulties and obstacles the progressive governments of the developing countries must cope with, and overcome, in order to accelerate economic growth. These difficulties and obstacles are not exclusively of an economic nature, but great many of them spring from the social and political background. Without the knowledge and analysis of these difficulties and obstacles of the political and social conditions, in other words, the entire gamut of state-economy relations, constituting their background, to Bogner, there can be no lasting economic growth. Asian tigers have indeed demonstrated that some developing countries, through positively profiled state-economy relations, are capable of overcoming such obstacles. In contrast to the Asian experience, however, Uroh (1998) has revealed that Africa is indeed in crises of development.

The present crisis in Africa...is a crisis of development, the problem is necessarily multi-dimensional. It is ... economic as well as political ... socio-cultural as well as moral. It is a product of Africa's chequered history...

From the submission of most analysts, the most formidable factor accounting for developmental failures in Africa is the nature of the state, and the resulting interaction between the state and the economy. In this circumstance, to Uroh, a workable solution to the problem would be that which deals with every department of the



problem. This exactly is the contemplation of the framework in Figure I.

Noticing the dual manifestation –success in Asia and failure in Africa, and as captured in the above framework, analysts have labored towards identifying different elements capable of making a state truly developmental; the absence of which could lead to failure. Mkandawire (2001) identified ideological and structural capabilities. Cibber (2002) noted the indispensability of state intervention and institutional capacity for effective planning and co-ordination of programs for goal attainment. It is the presence of these capability elements in Asia that made Lall (1993) to submit that “some interventions ... may have helped some of the larger leading industrializers”. But, in certain circumstances as witnessed in Africa, selective promotion was not really effective in meeting its objectives and, cannot be undertaken by governments lacking the skills and impartiality of the East Asians. Therefore, much of the problems underpinning institutional incapacitation in African have their roots in excessive weakening of the state by “human blunders and corruption” (Davidson, 1992). This was helped by the subversive roles of individuals and groups in their avowed selfish quest for survival. Institutionally,

*...the more one ponders this matter the more clearly is it seen to arise from the social and political institutions within which decolonized Africans have lived and tried to survive ... (Davidson, 1992; Esman, 1972; Young, 2004).*

This systemic incapacitation has given rise to pronounced systemic disarticulation (Weignast, 1997) in socioeconomic development across Africa. Summarizing developmental trajectories of transiting societies, Rosenau (2000) stated:

*Most conspicuously, there is all too little effective governance capable of ameliorating, if not resolving, these... numerous ...problems. Perhaps even more troubling, our generation [of leaders] lacks the orientation necessary to sound assessments of how the authority of governance can be brought to bear on the challenges posed by the prevailing disarray.*

Hence, one commends the remark by Fukuyama (2004) that effective state is a prerequisite for development to enable effective enforcement of laws, policies and programs as well as efficient regulation of economic activities and forces. It remains sacrosanct that there exists a general causal relationship between socio-economic development and political development (Mrydal, 1968; Akkerman et al., 2004; Gonzalez and King, 2004).

Largely, past the first decade of the twenty-first century, political elites across Africa have not fully woken up to the reality that their political opportunistic disposition remains a barrier to economic development and threat to sustenance of democratic order. Political elites seem not

to have realized that it is the duty of the government to create rule of law necessary to underpin accountability, transparency and predictability; and that government interaction with its citizen, more than any other factor, remains a modal precondition for thriving or declining domestic economy (Brautigam, 1991). This is the reason issues of governance are now in the fore of domestic and international political and economic discourse (Anyanwu, 1997). For transiting regimes across Africa, contrary to the corrupt tendencies of political opportunists, governance should therefore be conceived as:

*the use of political authority and exercise of control over a society and the management of its resources for social and economic development, encompassing the nature and functioning of the states, institutions and effectiveness of leadership, and the nature of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled (Landell-Mills and Seradeldin, 1991; Martin, 1991).*

It is in this context that state-economy relations is summed up as a gravitational process between the state and the economy, in which the nature of one impinges directly on the nature of the other for a mutually reinforcing constructive or destructive symbiotic outcome. State-economy relations is concerned with the manner of resource management, degree of economic nationalism, manner of resource utilization and conservation, level of corruption and the extent of state's role in economic development. Except the nature of the state and the effervescent state-economy relations is constructively developmental, a nation, no matter how naturally endowed, cannot experience development. What, more than anything else, account for development or underdevelopment, or systemic sustenance or otherwise of a nation, is the nature of the state and the effervescent state-economy relations. In this comparative analysis, specific insights are drawn from Nigeria and South Korea using some of the indexes of stateness in Figure I.

Universally, there exists a consensus that efficient bureaucracy is indispensable for an efficient state and vice versa. To further demonstrate that nature of the state, and its impacts on the effervescent state-economy relations creates much of the difference in development outcomes in Asia and Africa, effort is made in the following analysis to reflect on three other indexes (the role of leadership, effectiveness of law and order, and structure of governance).

### **The role of leadership as a nodal state index in the development of South Korea and underdevelopment of Nigeria**

South Korea developmental experience provides an ideal example of development-envisioned leadership. Despite historical evidence of autocracy, Korea is reputed to have

had crops of leaders that are not only committed, but also through authentic performances enjoyed the confidence and support of the populace towards rapid national development. From available precolonial, colonial and postcolonial history, a recount is made below of Korean leadership exploration:

1. One of the earliest efforts towards effective national development by Korean leaders was by King Taejo, who made the first clear-cut public law drafting 10 injunctions. In quest for a just and egalitarian society, his successor, King Gwangjong (949-979) instituted emancipation of slaves in 956 to restore the commoner status of those unjustly bonded, and established a civil service examination system to recruit officials by merit. The successor, King Gyeonjong (975-981) established an effective centralized government, while King Seongjong (981-997) adopted Confucian state model, improved education (Jeong-Kyu 2001) and embarked on refabrication of arms into agricultural tools (KIOS 2003:56-57).

2. Subsequent leadership, Yi and his followers further propelled the quest for learning, leading to the establishment of a college and five municipal schools in Hanyang and several local schools in all magistrates. In 1403, Yi, casted new fonts for Korean alphabet, and his administration structured the civil service into six boards of administration, namely: civil appointment, taxation, rites, military, punishment and public works.

3. The rule in the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century by King Sejong, the Great (1418-1450) was marked by 'progressive ideas in administration, national scripts, economics, science, music, medical science and humanistic studies. This King established Jiphyeonjeon (Hall of Worthies) to promote research in institutional traditions and politico-economics, published classic work on Korean agriculture (Straight Talk on Farming), developed pluviometer in 1441 to record precipitation, and ensured better development of the Korean alphabet. King Sejong, paying great attention to the health of his subjects, compiled the first medical books and developed a 365-chapter compendium on Chinese medicine. *Hyangyakjipseongbang* –a compilation of Native Korean Prescriptions in 85 chapters was completed in 1433, which later included 959 entries on disease diagnosis, 10,706 prescriptions and 1,477 items on acupuncture therapy, and another book on collection of local medicinal materials –the *Hangeul*. Economically, King Sejong established three ports for international trade and embarked on comprehensive compilation of the *Gyeonggukdaejeon* (Grand Code for State Administration) ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sejo\\_of\\_Joseon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sejo_of_Joseon)).

4. Prior to the colonial occupation, Korean leadership have ensured massive development in so diverse areas of national development including the military. As early as Joseon's reign, Admiral Yi Sun-sin was recorded to have conducted series of brilliant operations in the South Sea making use of Korean ship- *Geobukseon* (turtle ships)

(KIOS 2003:65-66) which destroyed many invading Japanese ships. The King initiated migration from densely populated to the sparsely populated area, while instituting the idea of 'Merit Award', and 3-yearly civil/military examinations.

5. Unlike the knowledge deficiency noticed in Nigerian history, to reveal the extent of the quest of the Korean leadership and state for promotion of knowledge in the pre-colonial Korea, there were more than 100 private schools in the 16<sup>th</sup> century Korea and by 17<sup>th</sup> century this has increased to over 400.

6. As derivative of visionary state and leadership that gave rise to economic prosperity and political tranquility, Korean population increased from 2,290,000 in 1657 to 5,018,000 in 1669 (<http://www.pennfamily.org/KSS-USA/hist-map7.html>). In pursuance of accountability and development, King Yeongjo, adopted an accounting system, revamped the financial system of state revenue and expenses, and participated in international trade along with Qing China. Contrary to most of Nigerian history dominated by aristocratic and development-inhibiting elitist excesses, by revolutionarily setting aside the traditional progress-inhibiting attitude of the *Yangbans*, in Korea, the coast was clear for development of technology and commerce at a greater dimension.

7. Combining the unity of knowledge and development, a Korean scholar, Jibong Yi Su-gwang, in the 16<sup>th</sup> century was reported to have said: Knowledge is of no value unless it results in action, just as enforcement is an essential part of the law (KIOS 2003:76). Contrary to the Nigerian experience in which education is still denied the required state attention, aggressive knowledge acquisition and its application by traditional Koreans greatly helped the course Korean development. Hong-Dae-yong (1731-1783) was recorded to have made valid scientific exploration pertaining to the cause of eclipses and the nature of rainbow, and in mathematics. Jeong Yak-yang, (Dasan, 1762-1836), planned the construction of the Hwaseong Fortress as Korea's emergency capital making provision for the use of his own applications- cranes, windlasses, pulleys and specially designed vehicles.

8. While research outcomes and other codified knowledge resulting from both academic and administrative inquiries are gathering dust on shelves without implementation in Nigeria, Korean masses, through education and discoveries, have come to appreciate good governance as early as 17<sup>th</sup> century (KIOS 2003:79). Resulting from cumulative efforts of nationalistic and committed leadership, the precolonial Korea was, modestly and by all standards, a rapidly developing society only to be 'disrupted and again accelerated' by colonial invasions.

9. Unlike the prevalent situation of absence of unity of direction in postcolonial Nigeria, due to accumulated knowledge, much of which outlive colonial disruptions, the postcolonial South Korea never had to lag for too long before the emergence of Major-General Park Chung-hee in 1961, following the systemically fragile regimes led by

Dr. Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and Chang Myon (John M. Chang, 1960-1961). With General Park, the economic development of South Korea was redirected with great emphasis on outward-oriented economy and export-focused techno-industrial development. Showing committed leadership, Park's government through exemplary leadership, stood out of all regimes as the most successful development-oriented regime in modern South Korea to the extent that Belassa (1980) considered the Korean example under Park, as an ideal model for nations seeking the attainment of rapid development.

In line with externalities of development, the Korean leadership, unlike Nigeria, advantageously moving from one economic paradigm to another, were both nationalistic and pragmatic (Byong-Man, 2003) in pursuance of national goals. Contrary to the Nigerian experience, where the state appears helpless in controlling many of the socioeconomic vices, with remarkably high dose of self-discipline, the Korean leadership and government, in strict control of developmental programmes, impartially applied the well-acclaimed 'carrot and stick' principle against even the much-favoured chains of chaebols and their subsidiaries. Mimiko rightly described the developmental influence of the Korean leadership as follows:

*...the moral integrity of the leadership is taken for granted, in which the mass of the people consider themselves as grass that 'must bend when the wind (i.e. superiors including government or authority of any kind) blows over it' ... in which people prefer harmony to an adversarial relationship. It becomes very easy for a dictatorial government that nevertheless has a clear vision of economic development to put the entire citizenry to work as one... (Mimiko 1999:18)*

Partly due to slavery-induced intellectual retardation, and also lack of visionary leadership ever since, compared to South Korea, Nigeria lacked similar account of great developmental strides. Though, each of the three areas making up the present Nigeria prior to colonial invasion had systems of government which socio, economic and political philosophy were very much different from one area to another, generally however, the specific features and governing orientations of these states robbed them of the achievements recorded by their Korean counterpart.

Added to the comparatively lower level of her development, compared to Korea, the advent of colonialism and process of decolonization resulted into the dysfunctional state of the modern Nigeria. Unlike the unity of purpose and direction in Korea, though amalgamated, the modern Nigeria became a much more divided society breeding 'contending internal constituencies' (Mimiko, 2005) with such social stratification constraining agenda for nation building and development. It is no surprise therefore that in such a society, the state elite, rather than unite toward

national development as witnessed in Korea became factionalized along ethnic lines with each preoccupied with ethnic interest as the surest path to advancing personal ambitions and wealth.

Unlike the unity of direction among the ruling elites in postcolonial South Korea, the process of decolonization generated undue complexities in the struggle for leadership in postcolonial Nigeria with different strands of elites- the military, the bureaucrats, the professionals/merchants and the politicians- seeing each other as rivals at the expense of cooperation towards national growth and development. This undue factionalisation led to normless struggle for control of state power and resources. The ensuing mutual sidelining and short-changing by ethnic and sectional lords bred politics of division, envy and bitterness. Thus, unlike the rapid developmental experiences in postcolonial Korea, the infant postcolonial Nigeria was robbed of the leadership consensus needed to collectively promote national development and the well-being of all.

The political decay of the immediate post-independence resulted into military intervention that was to further compound the problem of the fragile Nigerian state. Rather than follow the path adopted by Park's regime, the Nigerian military and their bureaucratic collaborators regrettably soon got involved in similar anti-development malaise of unparalleled socioeconomic and political corruption that later saw the Nigeria becoming a crippled giant and a pariah among the committee of nations. While Korea's King Yeongjo enforced accountability in governance long before the onset of colonial occupation, due to corrupt maneuvers, Odedokun (1990) revealed that for a fairly long period of time in the years immediately before and those after the Second Republic (1979-1983), with many instances of untrackable recurrent expenditure, there were no record of governmental budgeting and accounting in Nigeria. Reportedly, as it was then, so it is still presently the case in Nigeria that as much as US\$20 billion of oil proceeds cannot be accounted for in year 2013. Also within the same year, the reported value of stolen crude oil was as much as

US\$12billion. Added to these are several allegations of illegal or unauthorized acquisition of cars and jets by Nigerian top public officials. Unlike the Korean experience, the Nigerian history revealed signs of unpardonable extent economic recklessness and abuse on the part of serially-unaccountable government and leadership, whose decadent level of economic irrationality obviate any evidence of genuine and selfless effort at national development. Recent experiences of corruption and wastes in government in the face of aggravating unemployment and mass poverty points to no other than a system that is operated for the pleasure of the powerful stakeholders on the one hand and pains of the masses on the other. In such systems, threat of systemic instability cannot be wished-away.

Presently, no other sector of the Nigerian nation shares

the blame for the woes of the country than its ruling class. The fact that no development policy or programme, without in-built self-serving motives of the stakeholders, has ever been properly implemented in Nigeria before now points to the unpardonable extent of leadership bankruptcy. Contrary to the success of the Korean leadership in enlisting the support of all towards national development, the prevalence of excessive leadership greed and corruption perpetrated through dysfunctional institutions, has inevitably turned the Nigerian political scene to become increasingly praetorian. The result is Nigeria becoming economically disarticulated, politically hysterical and systemically unstable.

Leadership failure, as an index of stateness, has been one single most important factor accounting for the unexpected underdevelopment of the Nigerian nation and a big source of worry for sustenance of democracy or any form of government for that matter. More than any other factor of development, the state, through the nationalistic commitment of the leadership, has been the single most important catalyst of accelerated, historically unparalleled and world acclaimed all-round development in South Korea. At the same time, state and the ruling elites has been the cause of acute underdevelopment, mass poverty and systemic instability in Nigeria.

### **Effectiveness of law and order, and credibility of rules- Nigeria and South Korea**

Nigerian laws as contained in the successive post-independent constitutions, and elaborately detailed and specified in those signaling the inception of democratic rules, –1979, 1989 and 1999, regrettably, remained nominal and impotent entities. The duplicity of rules and institutions all aimed at, but manifestly unable to tame many of the vices in the society are clear testimonies of the country's sorry state as far as effectiveness and credibility of rules are concerned. In Nigeria, there are several hundreds of penal/criminal codes prohibiting nefarious socioeconomic activities as corruption, Economic sabotage, and detailing corresponding penalties for contravention. However, according to Ayoade:

*...governments in Nigeria ... choreographed different constitutions and visions. Unfortunately ... constitutions are the perpendicular expressions of horizontal desires. They are veritable elements of strategic deception. No ... government has ever used its own constitution or any constitution for that matter...For them, a constitution is a hindrance to government. ...The absence of a constitution means the absence of a standard of measurement of performance... (Ayoade 1997:18-19, see also Anifowose 1999: 157-169)*

At the inception of the Nigerian Fourth Republic, a host of institutions and processes were initiated- OPUTA Panel,

Independent Corrupt Practices Commission- (ICPC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency- (NDLEA), Economic and Financial Crime Commission- (EFCC), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), all aimed at curbing one form of corruption or another. If anything near relative success has been noticed, only the last three seem to have made marginal impact. The principal organ established for the control of politico-economic corruption has not. Hence Ogbonna (2004) submitted:

*... winning the war against corruption appears to be a pipe dream with the ICPC already branded a toothless bulldog for its failure to prosecute the 'big-catch'... while the ordinary Nigerians get harassed by the Anti-Corrupt Commission.*

With government's helplessness at instituting control against crude oil theft, oil-money theft and increasing reckless financial abuse and corruption by principal officers of the state, the impact of corruption and lawlessness has become so alarmingly in Nigeria. With the growing massive corruption, undisguised anti-social vices, in and out of government and daily report of wasteful and ostentatious life-style of the governing elites, Nigeria, in twenty-first century has again found itself in a state of self-inflicted vicious-cycle of underdevelopment. And, with the recorded insincerity and poor outcome of previous efforts at instituting control, no hope seems to be in sight. Noting the continued helplessness of the state at instituting appropriate sanction against corrupt practices, Agbese (2005) citing Okigbo noted:

*Investigative panels have not been used as effective checks on the misuse of power in Nigeria. Instead of using such panels or commissions to hold public officials and institutions accountable for their use of public resources, they are mainly used to conduct witch-hunts against political opponents and as substitutes for dealing with difficult political problems. (Agbese, 2005 in: Guyer and Denzer, 2005:56).*

Experience has shown in Nigeria, even in democratic dispensations that many of those who are to make and ensure implementation of laws are perverse individuals indulging in fabrication of self-seeking policies across levels and spheres of governance. Consequently, corrupt tendencies increasingly manifest in Nigeria despite arrays of what has turned out to be 'nominal' corruption-restraining institutions and laws. According to Otobo (2002), "Nigeria has an impressive array of institutions designed to combat corruption and promote public accountability, reflecting the strong public demand for action in this area". But, these institutions have functioned less than adequately. The result is institutionalized corruption since the late 1980s to the present dispensation.

It is known globally, that one of the key prerequisites of stateness is, the ability to have the laws of the state as the norms that guide and shape the lives of the citizens. The prevalence of corruption and anarchy in Nigeria have given rise to other problems as proliferation of ethnic militia (Sesay et al., 2003:1-2) untamed armed bandits, cultism, 419 (transnational financial scams), political assassination, criminal closure of oil facilities, kidnapping and seizure of personnel working in the oil multinationals. Policies are integral parts of rules and laws guiding the socioeconomic and political life of nations. The fact that no policy, apart from those fanning the embers of 'current power holders across regimes', has ever clearly succeeded in Nigeria, shows that effectiveness and credibility of rules have for long been a problem in Nigeria. This, no doubt, has greatly robbed on the degree of the stateness of the Nigerian state.

Against the Nigerian experience however, the South Korea state has been largely effective in making its laws as the norm among her citizens and subjects. The South Korean State has not only been able to make credible rules and formulate pragmatic developmental programmes, but also, it has been able to prudently enforce virtually all its laws and programmes to the admiration of the world (Mimiko, 1999:36 citing Lim, 1981). Given the libertarian notion and propensity of all entrepreneurs, Korea's success, contrary to the neoclassicists' notion of completely unregulated economy, could have been frustrated by the private sector's profit motive but for the vigilance and strict adoption of 'carrot and stick' principles by the Korean leadership. Despite their influence, even the chaebols, in the hands of the nationalistic Economic Planning Board of Korea became but mere executing agencies of the plans of government (Ogle, 1990).

In all these, the Nigerian state failed woefully. All through 70s and 80s import licensing was abused. SAP was made self-seeking and foreign exchange administration officially distorted and abused; political Kleptocracy heightened capital flight to unprecedented level. Overseas traveling, which was for many years state-controlled in South Korea was well used and abused as avenue by government officials and collaborators to siphon the resources of the country to overseas bank accounts. Till date, in five decades of her existence, only few handpicked public officials have been officially exposed for such vices as corruption and money laundering.

Agreed, there were reports of corruption in South Korea. It was however, in magnitude, no match for the Nigerian experience. In South Korea, there was a heavy public disdain against corrupt practices. The first elected President Sygman Rhee was forced out of office through mass demonstration against his corrupt and short-sighted regime in 1960 (see [http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ks\\_indx.html](http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ks_indx.html)). Besides, unlike Nigeria where leaders dubiously siphoned billions of dollars abroad, much of such funds in South Korea were invested locally

to further boost the Korean economy. Unlike Korea, rules and regulations in Nigeria have largely remained nominal entities with no social capital and motivation on the path of the state and leadership to enforce for societal order.

### **Structure of governance: A structural explanation of South Korean development and Nigerian underdevelopment**

Nigeria, in theory, claimed to be practicing federalism with a three-tier structure of governance- one (1) central government, thirty-six (36) state governments and seven hundred and seventy-four (774) local governments- excluding those purportedly created under the 1999 dillonised constitutional arrangement that are being denied state recognition. Though the 1976 local government reforms sought or implied a three-tier governmental structure of equal partners, going by the argument of Olowu et al. (Olowu et al., 1995:22; Enemuo and Anifowose, 1999:311-313), monarchy has being a central problem accounting for social, economic and political underdevelopment in Nigeria.

Though Nigeria has never for once, all through her jaundiced political history, jettisoned the 'federal rhetoric', the ideal spirit of federalism, due to economic and political corruption, died apparently within few years of Nigeria independence (Ayoade, 1997:19). By 1964, because of the politics of corruption and bitter ethnic rivalry between those at the centre and the regions, the paraphernalia of polycentricity have started crumbling in Nigeria. The advent of military intervention in politics soon completed the over-centralization of power and resources in Nigeria with all its attendant problems. In total neglect of constitutional arrangement, the military, rather than address the problem of "build-up of power at the centre" (Ayoade, 1997:19) has, through its operations and activities, only worsened it with the emergence of a highly centralized political, economic and administrative system that elevates too many divisive issues to the centre. The centre became too attractive and heightened the desperation in the struggle for power amongst the gladiators for political office (Olowu et al., 1995). Wunsch and Olowu (1990:17-18) identified five critical senses of such centralization in Nigeria. They include: political centralization, institutional centralization, economic centralization, financial centralization, and administrative centralization with all its attendant ills. The result:

*is not only waste and corruption in central level governments but [also] inability of lower-level governments to... maintain available infrastructure ... struggle to control the central government becomes a life and death struggle among the political leadership ... Might inevitably becomes right and all norms about right, morality of government actors, legitimacy become luxuries which are easily expended (Olowu et al., op cit. 20-21).*



Under such situation, the idea of promoting national development and people being the end of government is thrown overboard. Contrary to expectation, federalism and its attendant decentralized system of government have failed to yield the desired even and rapid development of both the resource-accumulating centre and the resource-starved peripheries in Nigeria. Against Wheare's principle, advocating co-ordinacy, independence and financial autonomy of centre and peripheries, the Nigerian federal arrangement and experience has been that of an asymmetric structure in which all the good things of life are concentrated at the centre where it is least needed. And, it is there, at the centre, that the resources are most extravagantly wasted to the peril of the peripheries with the consequence that the inadequate trickling-down to the peripheries also ends up being corruptly expended, since they are in most cases insignificant in meeting the actual needs of the periphery governments.

Unlike Nigeria, South Korea made no pretense of being a federal system. According to KOIS (2003:133) highly centralized government has been a strong tradition in Korea, extending back more than six hundred years to the establishment of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910). But, her unitary arrangement allows for a level of decentralized developmental initiatives and cooperation that seem impossible to most vocal critics of unitarism. Unlike Nigeria, with purposeful centralized planning and co-ordination based on inputs from every sector, private and public- central government, periphery governments [the sixteen (16) higher level (provincial) governments and 235 local level (municipal) governments made up of 72 *si* (city) governments, 94 *guns* (county) governments, and 69 *gu* (autonomous district) governments], all sectors, private and public were well-resourced and were therefore in position to make adequate contribution to national development. Though in Korea, the 16 provincial and the 251 municipal governments have been granted some level of local autonomy. Despite the granting of local autonomy, as a safety-valve for ensuring rapid and even national development, virtually, all major policies, including those specifying local government functions, taxation, resident welfare and services, and manpower management, are determined by the central government (KOIS, 2003:119). In essence, the status of lower tiers of government in South Korea is constitutionally not different from that of the dillonised Nigerian subsidiary governments. But, because the Korean system, as against the corrupt and parasitic experience in Nigeria, is a purposeful and development-driven entity, despite centralization, all the tiers of government were able to contribute their quotas to national development.

For example, unlike Nigeria, where ownership and control of major infrastructure is centralized, only international ports are controlled by the central government in South Korea. Local governments independently operate twenty-two of the coastal ports. Despite centralization, to

accelerate the pace of development through fast-tracking of business operations, private sector participation in Cargo handling as Terminal Operating Companies- (TOC) has long been embraced in Korea. To further show the extent to which local initiatives and participation are allowed in South Korea, local governments were allowed, within the ambit of the national forest development plan to set up their own forest plan. The fact that in 1997 alone, South Korea exported US\$340 million worth of mushroom and chestnut, an undertaking that can only be best monitored through local services, meant that local involvement has its merits and contribution to South Korean development (KOIS, 2003:278-279). It should be pointed out that constitutional issues relating to the structure, power and resources of the lower tiers of government in South Korea, is not so much different from that of Nigeria. The main factor that has accounted for the rapid national development permitted by the Korean structure of governance and intergovernmental relation is the patriotic commitment of the Korean state and leadership at all levels.

Except all the indexes of stateness (leadership, enactment and enforcement of law and order, bureaucracy, state capacity and autonomy, and structure of governance) and the resulting state-economy relations, are properly profiled and effectively managed, a nation, no matter how naturally endowed, cannot experience development. What, more than anything else, account for development or underdevelopment, or systemic sustenance or otherwise of a nation, is the nature of the state and the effervescent state-economy relations. There is no doubt that the manner in which the governments go about interfacing with the economy serves as the trigger for either success or failure (Belassa, 1980). Whether in developing democracies or in autocracies such as are common to developing regions of the world, particularly, Africa in the recent past, the problem over decades has been that:

*perfectly rational policy makers do not always bring that analytical rationality to play on their policy formation because of their inclined preoccupation with parochial and self-seeking motives.*

To Alesino (1992), the failure of such leaders is traceable to their preoccupation with opportunistic or partisan motives of how to ensure re-election or survival in office, or persuaded to follow policies that fulfill the parochial needs of their special constituencies even when it is considered manifestly detrimental to long term overall objective of the larger society.

This work therefore reinforces the thesis that constructive relationship between the state and the economy is a sine-qua-non for all round socioeconomic development, and that more than it was in Asia (Streeten, 1969; Berger, 1971; Chau, 1993; Lin et al., 1994; Zhang, 1996; Nellis, 1999; Xu, 1999; Mody, 1999), developing

framework for development-prone state-economy relations has become more compelling and urgent for most transiting states and democracies in Africa.

Therefore, any attempt to mitigate the problems of underdevelopment and systemic instability in African transiting states and democracies must seek to first adequately understand the nature of the state, the potentials of the economy and move ahead to develop appropriate state-economy relations as a complex but indispensable network of variable, factors and processes. A purely one-shot 'political analysis' or purely 'economic-deterministic explanation' will offer a very little answer to the puzzles. Curious analysis of the nature of the state and the nature of the economy will produce the needed indexes for understanding the symbiotic relationship between the state and the economy. As yet, many of those at the helm of affairs across Africa have little understanding of the potential strengths and dangers underlining the systems they preside over. Until this robust understanding of the nexus is provided, the hope of attainment of development and sustenance democracy across Africa remains very fragile.

## Conclusion

There have been serious efforts by analysts to explain the trajectories of underdevelopment and democratic instability across African regions. In particular, several univariate factors have been singled out, one after the other, to explain the regrettable pervasive and least expected underdevelopment in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the problem of underdevelopment and systemic instability has not abated. Various regimes – democracy and military, have failed to live up to expectation and consequently, all have been forced out of power when the regime holders least imagine. In short, no feasible solution seems at sight in understanding and proffering solutions to the African myriad of problems.

Therefore, the view here expressed is that to unveil appropriate solution, we must, comparatively, understand what the experience has been in some successful regions, this time, Asia. It is believed, more than any other factor that, the problem of most African countries derive from the nature of their states and the attendant negative relations between the state and the economy. State-economy relations here summed up as a gravitational process, involving a whole network of institutions and processes, between the state and the economy in which the nature of one impinges directly on the nature of the other for a mutually reinforcing constructively contributive or parasitically destructive symbiotic outcome, has not been positive in Nigeria and sub-Sahara Africa. It is therefore expedient to posit that except the principal indexes of both the state and the economy are positively correlated as it is witnessed in South Korea, development in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa will remain elusive, poverty will become more excruciating, and democracy,

or any regime paradigm adopted will continually remain discredited and threatened. It is the belief that adoption of the analytic comparative SERD model here commended will represent a modest attempt at unveiling solutions to the many problems of the heavily underdeveloped societies. In helping to unveil the critical ramifications of the challenges of development faced by average less-developed transiting democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, this more exhaustively-indexed SERD model provides the framework for a robust characterization, analysis and understanding of the nature of the state and the 'nexus' between the state, the economy and sustenance of democratic order. It is then the hope of inventing appropriate strategies for ensuring sustainable socio-economic and political development of nations under fruitful democratic dispensation can become a reality.

## Conflict of interest

The author has not declared any conflict of interest.

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*Full Length Research Paper*

# **Identity, centralization and resistance in Ethiopia: The case of Nuer and Anuak**

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**The Anuak-Nuer resistance to centralization traced back to their incorporation in the last decade of the nineteenth century. It was a reaction against submission, and aggravated and shaped by the new developments in Ethiopia and British-ruled Sudan. The perspectives of local and ethnic groups and formation of local groups, identities and interests have been formed, dissolved and affected the political and social processes and changes along the Ethio-Sudanese borderlands since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The purpose of this study is to examine center-periphery relations and the dynamics of shared identities. It also explains the key determinants of the resistance against the centralization processes on one hand and to some extent, the evolution and development of minority identity and politics in the political economy of the study area on the other. A multidisciplinary study emphasizes the anthropology, politics and history of the Nuer and Anuak in relation to the center.**

**Key words:** Identity, resistance, centralization, Ethiopia, Nuer and Anuak.

## **GENERAL BACKGROUND**

Territorial incorporation, unification, centralization, identity politics and citizenship were the main historic processes of the 19<sup>th</sup> century history of Ethiopia. The process was attempted differently in different times and places. For Emperor Tewodros, for example, it was making of an absolutist and centralized state. In the words of Bahru "Tewodros once styled himself husband of Ethiopia and fiancé of Jerusalem, and he was to prove himself a jealous husband indeed" (Bahru, 1976:43). Yohannis IV, his successor, however, was more liberal and ready to decentralize power to his followers and regional lords. His approach helped him to be more successful than Tewodros in establishing a unitary state. In a parallel manner, the emperor weakened centrifugal forces,

tendencies and powerful lords by creating and maintaining political, economic and military equilibrium.

The process of centralization and territorial incorporation reached its climax in the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This was during the reign of Emperor Menilik (r.1889-1913). In the process of making a centralized and modern Ethiopian state, more areas were conquered and incorporated (Bahru, 1976). These newly incorporated areas were at different stages of social evolution and development. Some were states; others were egalitarian societies, like Nuer and Anuak; and still others were in the process of transforming from egalitarian to state societies. In explaining the features of social stratification and state formation, Walter (1969) wrote the following:

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Tribes are larger communities integrating different bands by principles of descent (lineages). Chiefdoms are the first social forms to differentiate political roles: lineages are ranked in a hierarchy that sets the descent group of the chief above others to indicate authoritative leadership. The power of the chief is centralized and relatively stable, and the economic order is to some extent structured by chiefly rule (through the organization of labor and the redistribution of wealth). In states, government is highly centralized in a professional ruling body separated from kinship bonds and organized into specialized offices that handle political, economic, and legal matters. The legitimized monopoly of the use or threat of force is one of the salient features of states. There is little disagreement over the transition from bands to states (Service, 1975; Roth, 1968).

Still, others argue that the main feature of a state is that central authority turn into fully established, institutionalized and regulated offices. State controlled laws are formal. In addition, judicial offices are assigned to act as third parties. Unlike chiefdoms, the political structure is clearly differentiated and territorially bounded. States have power to use physical force, both internally as well as externally, by means of an organized and permanent army. This is done through a formalized judicial and punitive system of laws (Stevenson, 1968; Vengroff, 1976; Haas, 1982). This was a typical characteristic of the Ethiopian state in the center before or in the course of territorial incorporation and centralization of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

True, for a people to become a state or part of a state, its political structure has to evolve in such a way that the authority of leadership is not only based on authority resting on a hierarchical relationship but also on a legal system to sanction the monopoly of force (Cohen, 1978; Keeley, 1988).

In the case of Nuer and Anuak, who were egalitarian societies (bands and tribes), reinforcement mechanisms operated within the traditional kinship structure. There were no formal laws to regulate behavior since the community was scattered and small enough to deal with matters in an informal structure and manner based on habits, custom, and domestic power. Here customary laws were an integral part of the social, political, and economic life of the community. Until the recent period, there were no modern legal procedures among the Nilo-Sahrans, including the Nuer and Anuak society (Dereje, 2010). Rather, it is customary laws that have played important role in the life of the community. The rules and legal mechanisms have been an integral part of the society. Their internalized nature has made them to have sense of right and wrong among the members of the community. As Cohen (1984) mentions customary laws have considerable legitimacy, though there is room for disagreement about particular legal outcomes. Among the Nilo-Sahrans in particular they are flexible and agreeable to change so that they ensure their continuation

and legitimacy.

In most of Nilo-Saharan society, leadership was not permanent. Rather, it is intermittent and could be accepted because of an individual's charismatic qualities, his sensitivity to public opinion, and his good advice, rather than his power to intervene as an executive third party. Power could be institutionalized to form a hierarchy of subsidiary offices. This could reduce the political significance of the kinship structure (Cohen, 1978). This was a typical political feature of Nuer and Anuak society during their incorporation by the central (Christian) state of Ethiopia. This process of incorporation and creating a modern and centralized was achieved by Menilek II who followed a tradition of territorial expansion that was started by Emperor Tewodros (i.e., Tewodros started it; Menilek completed it). This territorial expansion and creating a centralized and unified state was the result of a number of factors. To begin with, there was a need to control both the vertical (north-south) and the horizontal (west-east) trade routes (Marcus, 1975). In this regard, Gambela area, the territory of the Nuer and Anuak peoples, was rich in ivory and other trade items. Secondly, the need for extra land to increasing nobilities was becoming a pushing factor. Finally, and more importantly, there was French and British colonial expansion to the Horn of Africa. In 1890s when both the French and British colonialism were expanding and encroaching the Ethiopian state, Menilek reacted in two ways: diplomatically and militarily. In the case of the former, Menilek wrote a famous letter to European powers defining the boundary of the country in April 1891. Likewise, he was working on ground and paper in western area (Gambela) to expand his empire and maintain his interest. Things were made systematically to avoid conflict with France, Britain and the Mahdist Sudan (Bahru, 1976). With France, he secretly agreed to provide material support in its expedition to create a Trans-African Empire. The Emperor sent his military mission to western Ethiopia together with Marquis de Bonchamps, who led a French expedition from Djibouti. In the case of the Mahdist Sudan, he wrote letter of solidarity to Khalifa Abdullahi, the ruler, on one hand and agreed to put arms embargo to the same state in the 1897 Treaty of Friendship with Britain on the other.

All these processes and events helped him to incorporate the people and areas under discussion. Accordingly, one of Menilek's famous generals, *Dejjach* Tesema Nadew occupied Gore and Gambella areas. The Ethiopian authority was slowly but steadily established. Institutionalization of centralized rule was attempted to make the Nuer and the Anuak part of a centralized and unified state. But this met stiff resistance.

## RESISTANCE AGAINST CENTRALIZATION

Both the Nuer and Anuak of Ethiopia lived in the lowlands

of Gambela region of Ethiopia. It is hot and tropical area. The area is rich, fertile, well-watered soil coming from the rivers originating in western and central highlands of the country where there is cooler climate (Bender, 1975). The Nuer and Anuak lived in the remotest and most inaccessible areas, in relation to the Ethiopian political center. They had no economic inter-dependence and social interaction with a wider social community. This made them not to have cultural and political ties with the center. The high land Ethiopians who considered the area as unfit and inhospitable for settlement did not affect them (Kurimoto, 1994). Both tribes were living based on very simple but self-sufficient material culture. This could be mentioned as contributory factor, among other things, in making of violence and development of violence behavior of tradition among the two communities (Kurimoto, 2002).

However, both the Nuer and the Anuak, who succeeded in pursuing more or less independence existence, were subjected to pressure from both the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments. The task of administrating peoples who did not have a centralized internal authority in their history would be very difficult. Seemingly, for this reason, the process of bringing the Anuak and the Nuer into a centralized form of political administration had been a gradual process in Ethiopian case (Kelly, 1987).

True, in 1897-98 the area was incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire, a turning point in the history of the Nuer and the Anuak. In 1898, with the imminent fall of the Mahdist state and the advance of the French Marchand Expedition, Emperor Minilek attempted to have an effective occupation of the region. But he was not successful because of resistance of the local people and shortage of provisions. According to many, it was not through campaigns of imperial conquest that the Nuer and the Anuak were incorporated into Menelik's empire. These areas were incorporated into Ethiopian imperial state as part of the raiding and tribute phase of Ethiopian expansion. Thus, it may be better to argue that Nuer-Anuak relations with Ethiopia were more of indirect, either confined to trade or being an extension of Nuer and Anuak relations with some of Ethiopia's subject peoples in the early years of the period (Baylegn, 1999; Paul J., Interview, 8.9.2001, 2).<sup>1</sup>

In 1902, the boundary delimitation of Ethiopia and the Sudan was made. This placed the majority of Nuer and Anuak inside the Sudan and Ethiopia respectively. Then after, the Sudanese government started to consolidate its control over the Nuer and Anuak communities. Accordingly, it advanced through military pressure and judicial regulation to obtain political submission. That is, the British colonial administration was characterized by a consistency of purpose (Jurimoto, 1996; *Addis Zemen*, 8. 25.1968).

Whereas, the Ethiopian government was moving in its flexible form. The administration of Ethiopia over the area was sporadic and seasonal. Therefore, effective administration was not energetically pursued and, in the long-term perspective, the mechanisms of Ethiopian administration became successful in extending its influence and authority. This was because the very flexibility of Ethiopian polities along the border areas allowed the communities to pursue more or less an independence existence together with their own spiritual and ritual leaders as well as their migratory habits. Until 1934, the kind of control that the Ethiopian government officials exercised over the Nuer and the Anuak was more of sending a few tribute gathering expeditions (Johnson, 1986).

Ethiopian administration in the newly incorporated areas of southern Ethiopia tended to tie its subjects to the land. Yet, this did not happen to either the Nuer or the Anuak, two Nilote peoples living in different ecologies, with different economies, settlements and political systems. Instead, in addition to flexibility, the Ethiopian government tried to recognize the political autonomy of the Anuak headmen and nobles by giving promotions and rewards. In this process, Ethiopia rule was able to extend its impact even in the territory of the Sudan through nobles of both tribes.

There were a number of factors for the absence of strong government presences in the area under discussion. To begin with, there were rivalries between the Gore and Sayo Ethiopian authorities. Though it lacked power of administration, the area south of the bank of the Baro River was proposed to be administered from Gore while the northern part was put under Sayo. Secondly, the inability of the central government to deploy a strong force that would maintain law and order contributed for the absence of effective administration. Finally, the presence of precipitous escarpments and inhospitable climate scarcely attract the attention of government officials and made the establishment of strong and permanent administration impossible (Ibid; Interview, Alebachew Kassa, 3.6.2012).<sup>2</sup>

The presence of rivalries between the frontier authorities of the two governments (Ethiopia and the Sudan) had also its own impact on the psychology of the people in relation to the centralization processes of the period in the region. The Nuer and Anuak themselves manipulated these rivalries and political ambiguities to their own advantages (Triulzi 1994). Johnson wrote:

*Throughout the early part of this century [the 20<sup>th</sup>C] the Nuer saw the Ethiopian state as an alternative to the Sudan, either as a threatening alternative that induced them to accept the Sudanese administration or as a refugee to Sudanese demands. It was always the comparative incompleteness of Ethiopian administration that was the most attractive inducement to live under*

<sup>1</sup> Paul is a *Woreda* administrator of Gambela region of today.

<sup>2</sup> He served as *awrajja* judge in the area until the fall of the imperial period.

*Ethiopian Authority (Johnson 1986).*

The Anuak also behaved in similar way. With the creation of the border and the alternative attractions of the two administrations, large number of persons moved from side to side as the opportunity arose or as occasion demanded. From both tribes, there was no great feeling of the permanent of allegiance to either of the governments. As one Anuak headman advised his son in the early 1930s, "he should give one hand to Ethiopia and the other to the Sudan" (Tippett, 1970).

In the early years of the twentieth century, both communities, being far from the center of the Ethiopian state, perceived themselves as outsiders and led more or less an independent existences. Thus, the Nuer and the Anuak viewed the various Ethiopian administrations as temporary intrusions. As the government tried to introduce its system of effective control, they reacted violently. For instance, one of the major sources of frictions between the Ethiopian government officials and the peoples of the region was the attempt of the government to maintain law and order by government interfering in traditional conflicts and disturbances. The Nuer and Anuak were irritated by government's interference to impose the rule of law by limiting freedom of actions and movement (Dereje, 2010; Donham, 2002).

In similar development, government's interference in traditional institutions aggravated the tension between the people and the government. To the local officials of the central government, the frequent change of chiefs was one of the reasons in destabilizing the area. At the same time, the deposed chiefs sought government help to be reinstated to their former positions. For example, an Ethiopian supported noble, Ulimi-wa-Agaaya, used his new power to murder his rivals. The interference of the government authorities to maintain chiefs were mostly unsuccessful as the people would either fight and prevent the imposition of the undesired chief or would wait and depose the imposed chief immediately after the government forces left the area. This continued even in the post-liberation periods (Evens-Prichard, 1940; Johnson, 1986; Flight, 1981).

Taxation was another cause of hostility between the two parties-the government, and the Nuer and the Anuak. This could be exemplified by the 1912 incident when a tribute gathering expedition from Sayo was met with a fierce Nuer resistance. There, about two hundred fifty men were killed from the government side and Nuer lost more than one hundred men and one hundred men were captured (Dermont, 1969). Confined to their natural environment, both the Nuer and the Anuak fiercely resisted attempts of tax collection.

With their hostile attitude towards external authority and having very little experience of government impositions, they regarded no reason why they should pay tax to the Ethiopian government. To them, paying tax was more or less similar to being robbed. For a number of factors, I have mentioned, the government authorities themselves

also did not show commitment to bring them under a strict central political administration nor hardly collected any tax except occasional raids where by local officials might loot their cattle, probably for personal benefit.<sup>3</sup>

In this period, both communities had been loosely coordinated with the central Ethiopia political administrative system. Government authorities themselves lacked the means of control and thereby they (the Nuer and the Anuak), for the most part, had been far from the immediate impact of the central political system. The central institutional systems were less exercised as one moved territorially from Addis Ababa to periphery, the Nuer and Anuak territories.

Arms in the hands of the local communities enabled them to resist external interference. In those days, the Nuer and the Anuak involved in arms trade more actively than before. Trade in arms in western frontier of Ethiopia was facilitated by the presence of fluid borders between the two countries. By selling ivory to Ethiopian highlanders, they were able to buy rifles. The main centers in the supply of fire arms, particularly to the Nuer, were Assossa and Bela Shangul. The ascendancy of Khojali al-Hassan's in 1908 and his competition with Jote escalated the arms trade (2131/2200: A letter to the Ministry of Interior, 1941).<sup>4</sup> The Ethiopian government became so reluctant to control the arms trade along the frontier. In 1910s, it was reported that there were about 10,000-25,000 rifles under the possession of the Anuak.

Until 1935, it seems more probable that this number must have greatly increased as supplies of firearms were continuing to the Nuer and the Anuak from the highland Ethiopians. Government officials themselves reported that the increasing number of firearms in the hands of the people threatened the security of the area. They (the officials) recommended that in order to maintain law and order in that politically troubled and volatile area the government should take measures to disarm them (Johnson, 1986). However, there were no such strong attempts of disarming the people by the central government despite open revolts of the people against local officials.

In 1911, for example, there was a serious uprising led by Nyiya Akwei who succeeded in bringing most of the Anuak along the Baro and Gilo rivers to his side. To suppress the rebellion in May-June 1912 the Governor of Ganame marched against the Anuak but he was repulsed by the Gaajok. The next year, the Governor of Gore Kebede Tesema and Jote of Sayo (who was deposed and reinstated in 1908) were ordered to subdue the Anuak on the Baro (Evans-Pritchard 1940). The force sent by Kebede suffered heavy casualty near Gambela and made a hasty retreat. The Sayo force numbering

<sup>3</sup> For details regarding the theoretical foundation of the hostile attitude of peripheral societies towards the central authority and value systems, see Edward Shills, "center and Periphery" in Potter et al. (eds.) *Society and the Social Sciences: an Introduction* (London: Open University, 1981).

<sup>4</sup> Ethiopian National Archives and Library Agency, 6.08.007

about five thousand was also met and defeated by a strong Anuak force at Fukumu, near Gambela, the main center of the Anuak population. Because of the continuance of the resistance, in 1914 Kebede was ordered to make another campaign on the Anuak. His men refused to move down to the lowland on the pretext that the rainy season was approaching (Levine, 1974).

The next year, Iyasu sent Majid Abdu, a Syrian Christian, who came to Ethiopia in 1906, with the task of subduing the Anuak along the Baro. He attacked the rebel chief, Akwie, with a force from the Gore and Anfillo but dissensions within his force crippled him. Burayo, who was sent to reinforce Majid, lost one hundred thirty-six men in one single engagement against Akwei's men near Itang. Majid was finally able to defeat Akwei at the battle of Itang on 21 March, 1916. Majid himself lost some fifty men. Akwei and other Anuak leaders escaped to the Sudan and continued rebellion. Majid's attempt to pursue Akwei was discontinued as he was replaced in June 1916 by Fenta, the Deputy of Ganame, Kebede's successor. Akwei died inside the Sudan in 1920 and the Ethiopian government tried a more conciliatory approach towards the Anuak and the Nuer for some time (Evans-Prichard, 1940; Johnson, 1986; Flight, 1981).

However, the Nuer and the Anuak resistance to central government continued and remained a serious problem. Still, being reluctant, the Ethiopian government stationed a few officials that were not adequate enough to force the population to submit to the rules and regulations of the central government and to end the perpetual disturbance that continuously threatened the peace and security of the regime. The officials could not establish close relations between them and local population. They were confined to their military garrison towns such as Gore. It seems probable that the central state had lost the hope of getting the people to be ruled under the centralized political administration. In 1966, the chief of the Jakao District police lamented, "... To hope that these people would be persuaded peaceful life through civil administration is like expecting the dead to rise from the grave" (Johnson, 1986). Rather, he suggested, these districts should be placed under martial law.

After 1920, both the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments began to tighten their control over their respective sides of the border. Nevertheless, the way they approach over the Nuer and Anuak was again drastically dissimilar. The British believed that because most Nuer were settled in the Sudan, all Nuer were Sudanese. Thus throughout the 1920s the British District Commissioner at Nasir freely crossed the frontier to follow the Jikany to their cattle camps.

In 1929, the British Colonial Administration in Khartoum prohibited these unauthorized border crossings. In 1931, under the pressure of the Ethiopian government, the Sudanese government admitted Ethiopia's right to tax those Nuer settled permanently in Ethiopia (Johnson, 1986; Kymlicka, 1995; Mohmood, 1996; Flight, 1981).

At the same time, constant complaints from the British

(who claimed that absence of law and order on the Ethiopian side was also affecting their colony) forced the Ethiopian government to pay a serious attention. Finally, both governments accepted a strict observation of the border. Under such conditions, Majid Abud was reappointed with full authority over the whole of Gambela region and Illubabor provinces. The jurisdiction given to Majid included those Nuer in the ambiguous position of living in the past years.

To assert Ethiopian authority over the Nuer, Majid followed the precedent of Biru, who appointed several Nuer agents in the Sudan in order to assert Ethiopian claims to the Daga valley. In this way, Majid was able to impose some degree of government authority from 1932-34 among the Nuer and Anuak communities. He made one Nuer a *Fitawarari* and another one a *Kegnazmach*.<sup>5</sup> He also handed out Ethiopian clothes to other Nuer chiefs who came to settle in Ethiopia. Many Nuer wished to escape unpopular British appointed chiefs and thus they came to Ethiopia where their ambitions were satisfied (Johnson, 1986; Flight, 1981).

This process of Ethiopianization of the two communities was accompanied by cultural influence. In early 1935, the Nuer Chief of Giet Gong, who had already declared his allegiance to the Ethiopian authority, visited the British District Commissioner at Nasir dressed in an Ethiopian high landers' dress (Bahru, 1976). This made the Khartoum government to look with growing concern. Majid encouraged more and more Nuer to build permanent villages in Ethiopian territory.<sup>6</sup>

In such a way, Majid was able to attract and influence both communities by both military and peaceful means. The increased contact with government authorities led to the decline of conflict between the two communities and local government officials. The noblemen and others who involved, directly or indirectly, in the central institutional and value systems started to feel closer the Ethiopian authority than their forbears had ever done in the early 1930s.

Majid made series of campaigns in 1932-34 so as to assert the Ethiopian government authority over the local peoples. In the words of Bahru, "if Menilik was the colonialist bargaining peoples and lands on a conference table, Majid was the soldier who did the dirty work of giving life and substance to those claims." His vigorous attempts to achieve the integration of the Nuer and the Anuak, however, interrupted by the Italian invasion of the country in 1935 (Bahru, 1976; Johnson, 1986).

### **New trends, identity and dynamisms of center-periphery relations**

In Ethiopia, we have a long history of establishing centers

<sup>5</sup> Commander of the right wing

<sup>6</sup> In 1933, for example, the Sudan government proposed a grazing rights treaty placing all Nuer under Sudanese authority. In 1935, the grazing rights were ratified but shortly after the Italians occupied the entire border.

where we see the continuation of culture and civilization till today. The process of making such centers has been shaped by the history and geography of the country. In most cases, centers have been seat of power and state. Centers have been dominant in the political economy of a country. The concept of centre-periphery relations signifies inequality existing in geographical space (Shills, 1981; Stevenson, 1968; Coakley, 1992: 344; Hannerza, 2001: 1611). Centre-periphery relations remain one important facet of Ethiopian history.

Peripheries in Ethiopia are historical and geographical constructs. Their inclusion in the traditional polity was spearheaded by Menelik II's territorial expansion and incorporation. Mostly, they are the geographical outer limits of the country. Owing to the structural weakness of the centre, successive Ethiopian governments did not command effective control over the peripheries. They used indirect rule and loose administrative means for control and regulation.

Areas, where the Nuer and Anuak live were peripheral in relation to the Ethiopian state. They have been also politically unstable and sparsely populated. They have been also characterized by under development, absence of dominant religion, lowland, hot climate and traditional life.

Until the fall of the Derg, they were not well integrated to the political economy of the central state. That is, until recent times, the Nuer and Anuak were peripheral in relation to the Ethiopian state. At the same time, like any society of the Horn, they had their own centers. Yet, in the region, some centers were more powerful than others were.

In the history of center-periphery relations of Ethiopia and the Horn, there have been cooperation, confrontation, integration and conflict. Confrontations have been varied and complex. This includes, for example, localists and elites, between owners and non-owners of the means of production and trade routes.

The history of resistance of the periphery against the center has become an outstanding issue in the political history of the area under consideration. This was because, among other factors, the central state was under capacity to deal with, for example, with nomads like the Nuer (Stark, 1986; Stevenson, 1968; Tippet, 1970). In this regard, despite its economic significance and strategic location of the Gambella region and its population (Nuer and Anuak), the government of post-liberation imperial Ethiopia (1941-74) put little effort in carrying out an integrative revolution.

Imperial officials in Gambella lived their lives in a kind of exile, the discomforts of which they tried to compensate for through predatory practices. Economically, in postwar period, the highlanders replaced the expatriate traders. Infrastructure and social services were virtually non-existent, except for limited efforts by missionaries, from the 1950s, to provide education and health facilities. Mission centers were perceived as de facto organs of the state (Markakis, 2003).

In 1974 the Haile-Sellase's government was replaced by the Military Administrative Council (PMAC) also known as the *Derg*. The new government adopted socialism and embarked on radical changes in southwestern Ethiopia. The *Derg* pledged to redress imbalances between the center and the periphery. Some practical measures were taken to enhance a sense of national belonging among the Nuer and the Anuak. Social services were expanded. Attempts were also made to promote both local languages, through the literacy campaign, and the representation of locals in the regional administration. In 1978 an Anuak and a Nuer were appointed vice administrators of the Gambella District.<sup>7</sup>

Such efforts at local empowerment, however, were overshadowed by the regime's project of control and its modernist zeal (Donham, 2002). As in other parts of the country, the so-called Cultural Revolution violently uprooted local culture. In an attempt to weaken traditional bases of power that were perceived as delegitimizing the central government at the grass-roots level, village chiefs and influential elders were dishonored and the local culture defined as 'backward'.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the political encroachment and stigmatization experienced by the border people during the imperial period was followed by the cultural encroachment of the *Derg* Regime. The political alienation of the people became more pronounced in the second half of the 1980s, when the area assumed a new strategic significance. By the second half of the 1980s, the border areas and their inhabitants became center of conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan. The Sudan peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) launched its military campaigns against the government of Sudan from its bases in Ethiopia, whereas the various Eritrean liberation movements were supported by the successive regimes in Sudan (Johnson, 2003).

This situation resulted in the rise of the refugee phenomenon, with its massively adverse effects on the economic and political life of the people. All of the refugee camps were established in Anuak areas. Apart from the ecological costs of such a huge influx, the refugee establishment greatly undermined the local economy. Imported grains to feed the refugees had the effect of depressing the local market (Kurimoto, 1996).

Above all, the presence of armed groups facilitated the ultimate militarization of both the Nuer and Anuak society. Nothing illustrates the failure of the *Derg*'s attempt at national integration in the region more than the irony that, by the mid-1980s, it was more rewarding to be a southern Sudanese refugee than an Ethiopian citizen was. Local

<sup>7</sup>Such attempts at integration, as well as the patrimonial nature of the *Derg*, expressed in frequent visits to the periphery, had earned the head of state Mengistu Haile-Mariam an affective Anywaa name, Wora Ariat, 'the son of a first born Anywaa woman', local symbolic attempt to further connect with the center.

<sup>8</sup>Anywaa village headmen (*kwaros*) were deposed, their blue bride wealth beads (*dimui*) were thrown into the river and bride wealth was forcibly monetized.

dissatisfaction resulted in the formation of a liberation movement, the Gambella Peoples' Liberation Movement (GPLM), which adopted the cause of a rebellious periphery against a national charter that had initially promised so much by way of an integrative revolution.

Lack of integration between the center and periphery, among other factors, in Ethiopian past urged the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which came to power in 1991, to introduce ethnic federalism. After this, highlanders' influence gradually declined. The political economy and administration of the region assumed to have equal and uniform status with the center that had never been in history.

The implementation of ethnic federalism has created a new political space and institutional design to further promote local empowerment among the Nuer and the Anuak. Accordingly, Gambella Peoples' National Regional States (GPRS) that constitutes mainly Nuer and Anuak appears to have been one of the most visible political steps ever taken by the Ethiopian state to integrate Nuer and Anuak into the Ethiopian state (Merera, 2003).

In such a way, Gambella was transformed from an obscure district to a regional state, resulting in a tremendous flow of financial resources from the federal government to the GPNRS, to meet the demands of the new political reality. This was reflected, above all, in a construction boom and in the expansion of social services. Local empowerment was also reflected in the redistribution of administrative power.

In post-1991 period, on the social scene, measures have also been taken to promote local languages, although, for practical reasons, Amharic is retained as the language of the new regional government (Perner, 1994). The three major languages of the region (Anuak, Nuer and Manjangir) are used in the schools as a medium of instruction and as a subject. The regional bureau of education has supported popular culture through printing folkloristic literature. Although developing the local culture has a long way to go.

As part of local empowerment, affirmative action has also been taken, especially in education and in the job market. As a result, educational facilities in Gambella have shown remarkable growth. The number of secondary schools rose and the capacity of the Teacher Training Institute increased. In 1997 the institute was upgraded to include junior secondary school teacher training and in 2001 it was promoted to the status of a college, with a diploma program in education and health (Dereje, 2010).

Regrettably, the successes of the federal experiment have been over shadowed by some conceptual flaws and problems of implementation. In the context of Gambella, this conceptual flaw is compounded by the failure to institutionalize and mediate competing and conflicting interests. Preoccupation with sectional interests in a multi-ethnic regional state like Gambella has precluded the evolution of a regional political community that could effectively connect, and negotiate its interests, with the

federal government (Ibid).

Finally, the main weakness of the federal experiment in the GPNRS has been the failure to form a workable political community that articulates its interest at the regional level. Unless serious efforts are made to address the legitimate claims of both the Nuer and Anuak and to rebuild trust amongst them, the viability of the regional state is likely to be further undermined and, with it, the moral and political legitimacy of the entire federal experiment.

## Conclusion

The Nuer and the Anuak were incorporated into the Ethiopian state at the turn of the twentieth century, specifically after the 1902 boundary agreement between British colonial Sudan and imperial Ethiopia. At the time of incorporation, the area was inhabited by various Nilotic-speaking communities built around different modes of governance and pursuing different livelihood strategies. The agrarian Anuak had developed a more centralized political system, consisting of village states, whereas the pastoral Nuer are shifting cultivators and were more egalitarian society.

Living in a very inhospitable climate and separated from the center by precipitous escarpments, the Nuer and the Anuak scarcely attracted the attention of the outsiders. Confined to a very simple but self-sufficient material culture, the Nuer and the Anuak limited their horizon of interaction. In both communities, the tradition of violence was so high in their life that it might not be surprising if the Nuer and the Anuak had conflict with each other on one hand, and used every opportunity to resist centralization effort of the Ethiopian government on the other.

In 1941, Italian occupation ended. Imperial Ethiopia Government (1941-74) had a vital economic interest in the Gambella region but put little effort into carrying out an integrative revolution. The military-socialist regime (the Derg) that replaced the imperial regime had pledged to redress the imbalances between the center and the periphery. Some practical measures were taken to enhance a sense of national belonging among the Nuer and the Anuak communities. Yet, it is the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that has taken more steps to integrate Nuer and Anuak into the Ethiopian state.

## Conflict of Interests

The author(s) have not declared any conflict of interests.

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*Full Length Research Paper*

# **Corruption and development administration in Africa: Institutional approach**

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**At the post 1990s, African countries undertook some democratic reforms following the end of one party authoritarian regimes and return to multiparty elections, which resulted in a more competitive political system. However, the central clog to economic transformation namely, public corruption remains germane. The paper explores some of the theoretical issues raised by the dynamics of socio-political change in Africa within the context of corruption and public administration including the internal and external dimensions of the unfolding corruption. It recognized that corruption in Africa is a development issue and therefore defines corruption as activities that undermine development and argued that corruption, which is largely conceived as diversion of public resource for private gains, significantly constricts development administration. This in turn impedes transition to developmental state. Corruption thus remains a theme that requires adequate attention in Africa's development discourse. Using the institutional approach and secondary data sources, it corroborates Sen's model of "development as freedom", and argues that development administration practice should now be guided by certain ethical guidelines defined on the basis of social justice, transparency, accountability and equality in order for African states to transform to developmental states. The paper refutes existing practices in Africa where bureaucratic corruption undermines economic growth, rather proposes institutional overhaul to usher in a developmental state.**

**Key words:** Development administration, corruption, developmental state, Africa.

## **INTRODUCTION**

There has been growing analytic tension and skepticism on Africa's possible transformation to a developmental state since the end of autocratic one party state and return to multi-party politics in the 1990s. The fundamental challenge has been public corruption which is the diversion of public resource for private gains and how it has been undermining development administration. Corruption is a development issue in Africa and finds

plausible extrapolation within the context of development administration.

Conceived as a colonial legacy, public corruption has eaten deep into the fabrics of public administration in Africa. Thus, bureaucratic bottleneck and red tape are enormously constricting transparency and accountability as development administration ought to have been an interventionist agency and purveyor of development.

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A brief genealogical mapping of corruption in Africa suggests that in the pre-colonial era, corruption was relatively unknown to Africans where rudimentary, agrarian and barter relationship existed. There was predominantly inter-tribal wars and conquests devoid of any closer approximation to modern corruption. Corruption in Africa is traced to colonial contacts following early European traders such as the Portuguese and economic usurp, quest for in-roads to the hinterlands with "gifts" to African traditional rulers, closely followed by slave trade and conquests as the colonial state "imposed" itself on African colonies with repressive policies.

Quantifying what Africa lost to Europe through colonialism specifically on slave trade alone, Walter Rodney argued; "The process by which captives were obtained on African soil was not trade at all; it was through warfare, trickery, banditry and kidnapping. When one tries to measure the effect of European slave trading on the African continent, it is very essential to realize that one is measuring the effect of social violence rather than trade in any normal sense of the word" (Rodney, 1972: 109).

Research on corruption in Africa has been increasingly engaged with questions of colonial and post-colonial institutional structures and their functions such as bureaucracy and corruption.

In his book, *The Dual Mandate of the British in Tropical Africa*, Lord Lugard, one of the British colonizing officials in Africa, stated; "the partition of Africa was, as we all recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the industrialized nations of Europe" (Lugard, 1965).

Ake observed remarkable difference in patterns of colonial administration and practices in Africa, stating that colonialism in Africa was markedly different from the colonial experiences of the Americas, Europe, and Asia: "it churned out administrative instruments and legislated taxes to induce the breakup of traditional social relations of production, the atomization of society, and the process of proletarianization" (Ake, 1996).

In a similar line of argument, colonial loots from the colonies have been identified as key incipient corruption drivers. On April 19, 2013, Reuters reported recent entreaty by Indian Government on British Prime Minister, Ronald Cameron for a return of Indian diamonds looted by the British Government in the colonial era, that was set in a royal crown of Queen Elizabeth. "Cameron ruled out handing back the 105-carat Koh-i-Noor diamond, now on display in the Tower of London."<sup>1</sup> "The diamond had been set in the crown of the current Queen Elizabeth's late mother" Cameron said; "I don't think that's the right approach." He further said, "It is the same question with the Elgin Marbles," referring to the classical Greek marble sculptures that Athens has long demanded be given back. "I certainly don't believe in 'returnism', as it were. I don't think that's sensible."<sup>2</sup>

Public corruption and its associated problems in Africa were hardly recognized as the continent emerged from colonial rule to independent states. Perhaps too unfamiliar with details of modern bureaucracy or poor grasp of long term effects of public corruption made it hard for the post-colonial African elite to see the problems clearly.

Former Tanzanian Minister, A M Babu described the lifestyles of emergent post-colonial African elites this way; "as soon as independence was achieved, the flags raised and new nations born-as soon, that is, as the leaders of the new states settled in their plush offices (just vacated, incidentally, by the colonial bosses)... they surrounded themselves with luxurious living quarters in glaring contrast to the ubiquitous shanties which pass for dwellings for those they claimed to be leading (Babu, 1981).

Since the early 1960s, researchers have devoted significant efforts to examine development administration in the developing economies (Kasfir, 1969), paying much attention to the effects of bureaucracy and the behavior of civil servants on economic growth and development (Mbaku, 1996).

Despite this emphasis on the study of development administration in post-independence Africa, there has been insufficient attention paid to corruption and development administration nexus in Africa which has remained understudied. More importantly, there seems to be a research gap on institutional overhaul and transformation of Africa's public administration in line with the developmental states.

Peter Gills writes; "it was not long when the first generation of African leaders assumed power that they started to fight about it, with many people wanting to lead and have a shot at the Presidency...Corrupt activities at that time were largely to advance and finance political parties and a struggle for political leaders to stay in power" (Gills, 1986).

But the problems lying in wait were not long in coming. The most dangerous of them is public corruption and institutional decay as corruption becomes a "way of life" in Africa.

Major challenge became poverty, inequality and lack of economic wellbeing. For instance, Luke Amadi observed that in five decades of political independence of most African countries, the first wave of post-colonial leaders decanted into one form of authoritarian rule or the other (Amadi, 2012b); such as Mobutu Seceseco of Zaire, whose corrupt and dictatorial rule held sway over Zaire for more than 30 years, allegedly made the claim that "democracy is not for Africa" (Leon, 2010), till the collapse of Zaire in 1997 after decades of corruption and misrule.

Arap Moi's twenty four years rule in Kenya was also characterized by massive corruption. Same goes for Omar Bongo of Garbon and Mathew Kerekou of Benin Republic.

Martin Meredith records the 1991 remark of the 84-

year-old Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who, after 29 years of untrammled authoritarian rule in Côte D'Ivoire, said, "There's no number two, or three or four . . . in Côte D'Ivoire. . . (T)here's only number one, that's me and I don't share my decisions" (Meredith, 2005).

By the end of the 1980s, out of some 150 heads of state who had governed African countries since independence, only 6 had voluntarily relinquished power—and even in those cases, after 20 or more years in office (Meredith, 2005; Leon, 2010).

Transparency International's (TI) 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), released in October 2010, identified Africa as the most corrupt region in the world.<sup>3</sup>

Equally, Paul Collier had demonstrated that Africa is today the poorest region of the world (Collier, 2007). Similarly, World Bank and UNDP reports corroborate this assertion (UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2012). All these point to the interrogation of the internal dynamics of Africa's abysmal economic performance in the post 1990s.

Since the end of the cold war and democracy resurgence, major concern has been, how to make "governance work" as most of the neo liberal experiments and Western prescriptive models lack exact conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent in the development of Africa. The challenge of transforming corruption in Africa remains enormous.

There seems to be only a choice of emphasizing this problem through close explication of the forms and patterns of Africa's public administration. This stems from the fact that such post-colonial structures as modern bureaucracy could be subjected to institutional reform.

The dearth of deep analysis and viable alternative route to development spotlights the need to evaluate the internal dynamics of corruption in Africa. We have chosen to explore development administration to delineate other forms of administration in order to understand the outer limits and patterns of Africa's governance in the context of development and to clearly decipher the basis of failures of governmental institutions and apparatuses in connection with corruption. Thus, discourse on development administration and corruption in Africa provides a paraphernalia to explore these challenges especially in an era of developmental state conceived as "a state which is by definition interventionist and pro-poor, and which seeks to address challenges such as poverty, low economic growth, lack of infrastructure, and unequal development, by deliberately using state resources to address these challenges" (Mbabazi, 2005 quoted in Maphunye, 2009).

Certain ideological and moral dilemmas have also been deeply felt as public administration in Africa falls short of being categorized as "developmental". The resulting variants of state accumulation have often contrived non-transparent and unaccountable governmental institutions which are weak in sustaining the major burden of

checking corruption.

In some cases, the little emphasis on fiscal accountability, effective macroeconomic policy and social expenditure, negatively affect resources urgently needed to expand the productive base of the economy, poverty remains pervasive.

Corruption is classified as grand, bureaucratic and economic. Our focus is on bureaucratic corruption which falls within development administration. This would be linked to a broader elucidation of grand corruption which is corruption between top political office holders, the award of contracts (public procurement), institutions such as governmental, quasi-governmental and multinational corporations (MNCs)- resource exploitation and rents. It is different from petty corruption involving bribery, kick-backs etc within the private sector.

The scale of grand corruption has been foreshadowed by scholars of African development. Collier (2010) explored the involvement of Western multinationals in corruption in Africa especially among the natural resource rich but poor countries like Nigeria, Benin Republic, Côte D'Ivoire, Angola, South Sudan, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tomi and Principe etc.

There are important ramifications for the study of corruption and development administration including analytic, comparative, academic, policy making and more importantly development implications.

## REVIEW OF LITERATURE

### Corruption and development administration

Corruption has become synonymous to Africa. This does not debunk its prevalence in other periphery and industrialized societies. Though, its severity and long term negative effects to development seem enormous in Africa.

As a colonial legacy, Meredith posits that until independence, "the opportunities for self-enrichment were limited; the principal beneficiaries of colonial rule were the European elite, officials and businessmen, enjoying a lifestyle which the Africa elite aspired to emulate but were largely prevented from reaching" (Meredith, 2006). He further observed that; "Independence unlocked the floodgate (of corruption). Politicians used their public office to extract 'commissions' at every available opportunity. The common cut on government contracts in West Africa was 10 per cent. In numerous cases, prominent politicians simply looted the state treasury, transferring money to their private accounts" (Meredith, 2006).

At the conceptual level are debates among scholars over the very meaning of public corruption. Amadi and Alapiki (2012) identified systemic corruption as inherent feature of the changing forms of post 1990 corruption within institutions. This occurs when corruption becomes an integral part of the social system present in the

economic, social and political system. It is a situation in which the major institutions and state apparatus are routinely diverted for personal gains.

Sen (1999) posits that corruption or corrupt behavior involves the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit. Corruption is effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means private gain at public expense; or a misuse of public power for private benefit (Lipset and Lenz, 2000).

Equally, Joseph Nye tried to capture these normative features as echoed in almost every argument that emphasizes the development aspects of an institution characterized by collective efforts at implementing laid down government rules. Nye argued that, corruption is a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role, because of private (gains) - regarding (personal, close family, private clique, pecuniary or status gains). It is a behavior which violates rules against the exercise of certain types of (duties) for private (gains) - regarding influence (Nye, 1967).

This definition includes such behaviors as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascribed relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private uses) (Bandfield, 1958).

According to the World Bank, corruption is the abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets or the diversion of state revenue (World Bank, 1997).

Both Guriev (2004), Kaufman and Wei (2000) have identified how many bureaucrats deliberately increased the level of regulation complexity in order to increase their level of bribes (Khan, 2008).

Ake (1991) re-echoed that; "the social impact of corruption is the creation of an atmosphere of tension, dishonesty, and weak and/or selective law enforcement, which, in turn breeds cynicism and erosion of faith in the political and administrative system. For example, the misallocation of resources rewards the indolent and those with the right connections, resulting in a disconnection between reward and effort"

Drawing from works on the fight against corruption, Andres (2008) examines "Governance for the 21st Century" and provides plausible insights with emphasis on challenges posed by corruption.

Amadi and Alapiki (2012) argued on "re-inventing anti-corruption strategies", through sound macroeconomic policy framework and strategic institutional overhaul.

A number of corruption themes are related to links between Africa's leadership failure, electoral fraud, terrorism, local conflicts, business cycles and conduct of

governance.

Related works have explored bureaucratic corruption as institutional variations across states or regions within countries, such as the work building on Mbaku (1996) who argued that in Africa bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of compensation by lobbying lawmakers and politicians and by engaging in other activities to influence the political system and maximize benefits accruing to them"

A similar strand has abandoned the cross-country focus to examine more systematically variations between individuals or at least lower levels of administration, such as communities, wards, local governments or villages. The resulting literature often reflects a far richer understanding of the specific context and, as a consequence, a vast array of locally relevant topics related to corruption such as kick-backs, electoral fraud, forgery, ethnic chauvinism, bribery, organized crime, embezzlement, bureaucratic processes, legal systems, local conflicts etc.

Jacob van Klaveren believes that a corrupt bureaucrat regards his office as a business from which he is able to extract extra-legal income (Klaveren 1990, cited in Mbaku, 1996)

Amadi and Alapiki (2012) opined that "corruption increasingly assumes an elitist character. This is perhaps in the context of public sector where the holders of political and economic powers divert public funds for private gains, influence the laid down policies for their own benefits and to the detriment of a wider segment of the society".

Whilst the ultimate concern is how these activities alter laid down rules, derail economic development, many of the deep issues associated with corruption in Africa have been documented. For instance, in October 2006, then president of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz disclosed that Nigerian officials had stolen more than \$300 billion of their nation's wealth over the last forty years (Leon, 2010). Several dynamics and modes of operation could be explicated, in recent times across Africa.

More critical perhaps is the involvement of Western governments and multinationals in perpetuating corruption in Africa, such as Shell (Netherlands/UK), Exxon Mobil (US), Chevron-Texaco (US), Schlumberger,(US), Halliburton,(US), AGIP (Italy), and Elf-Aquitaine (France), BP (British), Siemens (German) etc.

With the return to democracy in the 1990s, corruption still remains in the mainstream public administration. Even African leaders that assumed democracy "pundits" could rarely conduct free, fair and credible elections along "democratic" lines. Electoral fraud remains their substantial strategies in order to retain political power; such as Nigeria under President Obasanjo, South Africa under Jacob Zuma .Several years of misrule of President Omar Bongo of Gabon continued with the imposition of his son Ali Bongo etc.

As Andrei and Vishny (1993) observed, "corruption has the potential to undermine sustainable development in

many ways. The extent to which corruption actually does so is determined by an economy's institutions and its existing capital assets. This is because they control the opportunities and incentives for politicians and bureaucrats to engage in the 'sale of public assets for private gain'.

Acemoglu et al. (2001) demonstrated this with regard to political institutions while La Porta et al. (1997) with regard to legal institutions (Aidt, 2011).

We define public corruption in Africa as any activity that undermines development. This development perspective is suitable as Africa's corruption dynamics is broad and cuts across various sectors such as health, education, commerce, industry, agriculture etc which affects economic growth and development.

On its part, development administration, according to Gant (2006), came into use in the 1950s to represent those aspects of public administration and those changes in public administration, which are needed to carry out policies, projects, and programs to improve social and economic conditions. He further observed that; "This new status gave promise of freedom and liberty and self-determination in political systems of representative democracy. It gave hope of greater individual freedom and equality of treatment in the society" (Gant, 2006).

He equally noted that development administration is generally similar to the traditional "public administration" in its concern with how a government implements its rules, policies, and norms. It differs, however, in its objectives, scope, and complexity (Ibid). He argued that it is more innovative, since it is concerned with the societal changes involved in achieving developmental objectives (Ibid).

Etzioni (1983) posits that the inherent tensions between bureaucracy and democracy may undermine the creation of developmental public administration machinery in Africa.

According to Wallis (1989), the word 'bureaucracy' "conjures up negative images in people's minds. It suggests a slow-moving organization, usually associated with government, which serves the public with a mixture of arrogance, deliberate obstruction and incompetence ... (and) 'bureaucrats' (the members of bureaucracies) are sometimes seen as figures of fun."

Early studies which foreshadowed the relevance of "public administration" to economic development include Frederick Rig's seminal debate; "Public Administration: A neglected Factor in Economic Development'.

Kasfir (1969) observed that, so little of value has been written about development administration in Africa that the main problem is to avoid uncritical reliance on theories formulated in other parts of the world...much of the writing about administration in Africa comes from expatriate civil servants and academic personnel involved in technical assistance to administrative training institutes...He observed that rarely do these writers compare the performance of different national or local administrative

structures, except to apply Western techniques to African situations.

Some authors have examined development administration to build a conceptualization that avoids what Mazrui (1995) refers to as "institutional failure" and the attendant burden, according to Amadi (2012b), that "development failure" seems pervasive in Africa unlike Asia and Latin America. For instance, Joel D.Bakan cautioned against the most powerful class of institutions on earth namely; the corporation, as being "hopelessly and unavoidably" demented. He argues that; "the corporation lies, steals and kills without remorse and without hesitation when it serves the interests of its shareholders to do so. ...Charming and plausible though they are, they can only ever see us as resources to be used" (Bakan, 2005).

In our views, development administration combines its administrative, deliberative and bureaucratic elements. We consider an administration developmental to the extent that it facilitates bureaucratic transparency against bureaucratic bottleneck, equality, accountability, permits the broadest and simplest access to information, compliant to public policy, and constitutionally guarantees all the freedoms necessary for expression and pro poor.

Administration at all levels across Africa should be subject to analysis and assessment based on values that cannot simply be reduced to how well government policies are formulated but how such policies are implemented for the capacity of the wider society to be improved, devoid of restrictions such as bottlenecks and red tape.

This perspective is consistent with well-known conceptualizations of development administration within the tradition of viewing questions of development through an explicitly freedom lens reinforced in neo liberal tradition in development theory with Amartya Sen's book, *Development as Freedom*, emphasizing "enlargement of capabilities". Strengthening of individual and institutional capabilities is central to contemporary development administration.

Some conceptualizations also seek to capture the arguments advanced by proponents of 'institutional development', conceived as "an organization whose affairs are collectively coordinated with interrelated sets of units and sub units to achieve laid down goals."

Rodrik et al. (2004) observed "that the effect of institutions trumps all other possible factors (e.g. geography) and that the quality of institutions has positive effects on integration. Their research has led the discussion not only because of the high quality of analytical research (regression, choice of samples) but also because of their convincing attempt to layout in which ways (direct and indirect) institutions affect income and growth".

In terms of theory, Frederick Riggs' prismatic theory has been influential in studying comparative public administration in the developing economies. For much of the post-cold war period, mainstream development

administration turned away from the fundamental ideas of comparative public administration articulated by Riggs to sustainable development administration with emphasis on institutional overhaul of bureaucracies and market fundamentalism.

Lucas (1988), for example, describes the obstacle to development administration as "simply accounting for the observed pattern of, across countries and time, in levels and rates of growth of per capita income..." adding that "...This may seem too narrow a definition...but thinking about income patterns will necessarily involve us in thinking about many other aspects of societies too..." Development administration in this paradigm was generally conceived as embodying historical, political, economic, social and technological contexts.

At the same time, it is a field that has rapidly evolved to engage directly with the causality question between administrative outcomes within the public realm encompassing institutional processes as political institutions and outcomes are shaped by economic conditions.

Thus, the immediate role of development administration in Africa ought to have been its exposure of the administrative obstacles to development posed by corruption and related social vices such as crime, insecurity, unaccountability, embezzlement and non-transparency.

The 'new' development administration can be seen as a direct response to this limited technocratic characterization of government: it is an attempt to re-focus attention back towards earlier considerations of how governance and the institutional structures emerging from different forms of political competition shape policy choices and ultimately economic outcomes for both human and institutional development.

Several proponents of globalization had argued that technological innovations and recent administrative modifications encompassing e-administration could improve public accountability and transparency lapses. In what might be called 'mainstream' or neo-liberal development administration, however, the emergence of an explicit 'new' development administration is more readily discernible in the evolving intellectual diagnosis of proponents of e-administration (Michel, 2005) and network states among the developmental states (Castells, 1992).

While established institutions in development administration such as bureaucracies, associated most strongly with the works of Max Weber remains weak in Africa, contemporary researchers tend to draw more directly from mainstream debates which have strongly interrogated the level of Africa's response to developmental state where arguments on Africa's prospects provided by Mkandawire (2001) seem much less sharply drawn.

The more recent travail of the failures of development administration namely; public corruption is yet to be broadly captured. Yet, it exemplifies the patterns of demands for radical institutional transformation.

The 'institutional failure' diagnosis links more generally to weak institutional capacities in systems of personal

and group rule. Bates (1986), Sandbrook (1985) identified the heavy use of patronage, the discouragement of agencies of restraint, and the emasculation of competing centers of political power as 'rational' strategies of African leaders in the context of weak political legitimacy and tenuous bureaucratic control.

This paper builds on debates by scholars who argue that corruption undermines developmental state. We shall elaborate this strand in course of this study through broader elucidation of corruption dynamics in Africa.

Development administration for our purpose is conceived as interventionist, procedural, responsive and encompasses strict implementation of laid down public policies for developmental outcome. The driver of this pattern of administration is "developmental"; thus, it has a common institutional core that establishes its functions. Yet this is not an end in itself; it is plausible to accept, that "Development administration is developmental to the extent that it meets core economic and social well-being of the people without which its aim is defeated.

We contend that the dominant way of characterizing development administration according to a set of institutionalist and procedural standards must be expanded into a broader conceptualization which seeks to understand the role of institutional structures such as bureaucracies in reshaping the conduct of governance down to the wellbeing of the people.

Development administration practice, in this sense, should be conceptualized as a broad interventionist practice defined within specific macro-economic policy frameworks guided by certain ethical guidelines which should be internalized within transparent and accountable procedures to regulate policy implementation.

### **Corruption, resource transparency and challenges of developmental state**

Sachs and Wanner (1995) had argued on the "curse of the tropics" in exploring the resource curse debate among countries in the tropics. In 2002 following the WSSD in Johannesburg, South Africa, veritable anti-corruption tool within the extractive industry namely; Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) was acceded. This provides a new look at corruption dynamics among the resource rich but poor countries. How has the public institutions in Africa and policy framings been designed to institutionalize resource transparency at post EITI?

In oil rich countries like Sao Tome and Principe, "The United States and the United Nations have pressured Menezes and his government into adopting an oil law designed to guarantee that all of Sao Tome's windfall income from petroleum is transparently spent on improving the lives of the tiny country's 140,000 inhabitants".<sup>4</sup>

The oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria has remained volatile with militants, though the late President Yaradua granted amnesty to the militants; the agitation has not



ebbed.

South Africa's current status as a regional hegemon being a member of the BRICS, is yet to pull the continent out of poverty, despite its rich mineral resources, poverty index remains high; for instance, the 2010 Global poverty index placed the country at a high poverty ratio.

Again, the several scandals of President Jacob Zuma including alleged corrupt practices, threatens resource transparency of the country.<sup>5</sup>

Whereas most countries of East Asia have transformed to developmental states. Young observed that; "Indeed, the only two African states whose macroeconomic statistics come close to matching Asian norms are Botswana and Mauritius, the only countries to enjoy democratic rule throughout the post-independence period (Young, 1990)

A similar view contends that throughout Africa, "from Algeria to Zaire, bureaucrats and politicians promote perverse economic policies, which while impoverishing most of society, provide concentrated and significant benefits to the national elites and interest groups" (Mbaku, 1996). Public service or bureaucratic corruption reinforces a breach of the public trust when the state or government lacks the capacity to demonstrate its commitment to public interest.

The resource-rich countries tend to grow at a slower rate than other countries. One often-cited reason that resource abundance fosters is a 'rentier' economy with rampant corruption and poorly developed institutions (Aidt, 2011).

Ngamlana observed in South Africa, that; "despite the efforts of state institutions such as the Public Protector, National Prosecuting Authority, Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and the HAWKS and many others, corruption in South Africa has taken a turn for the worse."<sup>6</sup> "As if the arms deal, the oilgate, Shabir Shaik and the 'Jackie Selebi and friends' saga were not bad enough, we continue to see worse shenanigans involving senior politicians and high profile government employees. Reports of tender irregularities by the Public Protector implicating Public Works Minister and Police Commissioner come as no surprise when one tracks back how half-heartedly government had committed to the fight against corruption."<sup>7</sup>

Recently, South African Justice and Constitutional Development Minister Jeff Radebe released the names of 42 people convicted of fraud and corruption - and promised to release many more - as a sign of the government's intent to clamp down on corrupt officials.<sup>8</sup> Lodge had argued on political corruption in South Africa as its prevalence remains pervasive (Lodge, 1998).

In oil resource abundant South Sudan, on 15th December, 2013 fighting broke out in Juba and quickly spread to many parts of the country. More than 1,000,000 people fled their homes; some to within South Sudan and others to neighboring countries such as Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>9</sup>

According to World Report 2013, corruption, poverty and repression continue to plague Equatorial Guinea

under President Teodoro Nguema Mbasogo who has been in power since 1979. Vast oil revenue fund lavish lifestyles for the small elite surrounding the president, while most of the population lives in poverty. Those who question this disparity are branded "enemies"<sup>10</sup>

In Gabon, weak institutional structure manifests in a number of ways including the civil service and "ghost" civil servants. In September 2013 corruption investigation in the central African nation uncovered 3,000 fake civil servants receiving salaries.<sup>11</sup>

Despite oil wealth, which accounted for over \$7 billion in 2008, Republic of the Congo remains one of the most corrupt and indebted countries in the world, and its oil wealth has contributed to several bloody wars. While the majority of the population are mired in poverty, a minority surrounding the family of President Denis Sassou Nguesso are able to live in luxury.<sup>12</sup> The 2003 corruption trial of numerous former executives of the French state oil firm Elf Aquitaine exposed how the company paid off the Congolese political elite in return for access to oil. Elf has even been implicated in the supply of weapons in exchange for oil during the civil war.<sup>13</sup>

Much of the natural resource wars and corruption in Angola was ignited with the likes of the late resource militia, Jonas Savimbi, whose death has not restored resource transparency. "Angola is one of the most egregious examples of a venal and despotic state fuelled by oil. The large-scale production of oil off its Atlantic coast in the 1960s extended and fuelled the 40-year-long Angolan civil war. During that period, 1 million people out of a population of 13 million were killed and 1.7 million people were displaced" (Guest, 2004; Leon, 2010).

Human Rights Watch alleged that the Angolan leaders have "lost" more than \$4 billion of state revenue between 1997 and 2002 (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

Sao Tome and Principe's oil wealth seem to overtake its once flourishing cocoa economy. There are well documented evidences of corruption and non-transparency in the exploitation of the oil resource. According to a particular account, "Many people point to the mysterious ability of senior government officials earning meagre salaries of only a few hundred dollars per month to erect luxury villas in the Campo do Milho, a new suburb springing up on the road from Sao Tome city to the nearby airport"<sup>14</sup>. Despite the increasing prosperity of an affluent minority in Sao Tome, overall living standards have fallen steadily in recent years, leaving the country with a per capita income of just US \$390 per year, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, in oil rich Chad, poverty is on the increase due to corruption. Nadjikimo Benoudjita, the Editor of *Notre Temps*, one of Chad's few opposition papers doubts, that oil will change anything. He said; "corruption isn't just a part of Chad: it's everything"<sup>16</sup>.

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study reveals new lines of inquiry from the institutional



approach which has been influential to re-value development administration and corruption dynamics at post 1990 Africa.

Scott (2004b) opined that institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse. Although the ostensible subject is stability and order in social life, students of institutions must perforce attend not just to consensus and conformity but to conflict and change in social structures.

The study deploys secondary data sets that builds on authoritative in-depth studies such as relevant Transparency International (TI) reports, World Bank Corruption Perception Index (CPI), UNDP Human Development reports(HDR), EITI reports and related seminal surveys and literature to examine the research subject. This aimed to broaden the scope of the study with a mapping of incidence of corruption among purposively selected countries within Africa.

Our study spans between 1990 and 2013. The period is important as it captures the end of cold war and changing forms African corruption dynamics have assumed at the resurgence of multiparty democracy and more importantly, the developmental states of Asia and need for transformation of Africa's public administration to follow suit.

More importantly, novel emphasis is laid on resource transparency among the resource rich African countries, following the introduction of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2002 and the Natural Resources Charter.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study shows that there is weak institutional structure to check corruption in Africa as public corruption is pervasive. A number of seminal data corroborate our findings for instance, among West African countries, a survey Report on National Perception and Attitude towards corruption carried out in 2000 by the National Reform Strategy of Sierra Leone, 92.3% of respondents considered bribery to be the most corrupt practice. In the survey, 94% of respondents considered corruption to be most rampant in government departments.<sup>17</sup>

The 2012 Transparency International report provided data on African countries with high corruption index for 2011: Nigeria is placed at a distant of 143 with a score of 2.4, only ahead of Togo (143), Uganda (143), Central African Republic (154), Congo Republic (154), Cote d'Ivoire (154), Guinea Bissau (154), Kenya (154), Zimbabwe (154), Guinea (164), Angola (168), Chad (168), Democratic Republic of Congo (168), Libya (168), Burundi (172), Equatorial Guinea (172), Sudan (177) and Somalia (182)<sup>18</sup>.

Among resource rich countries, several factors affect the post EITI extractive policies. In oil rich Equatorial Guinea, a close observer argued; "there is no such law in nearby Equatorial Guinea, where Obiang....spent \$55 million on buying a brand new presidential jet, even though his 500,000 people still lack a reliable electricity supply and clean drinking water."<sup>19</sup>

Similar results such as the 2013 TI's institutional corruption survey shows that Africa ranks high in

corruption. Africa has prolonged retention of disastrous corrupt practices, such as organized crimes including the ongoing horning of elephant for Ivory in East Africa which endangers elephant species, the Boko Haram terrorism in Northern Nigeria, El shabaab terrorism in Somalia, extravagant lifestyles of African leaders such as President Ali Bongo of Gabon, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, Isabel Dos Santos-daughter of the President of Angola etc.

On March 31<sup>st</sup> 2013, it was reported that South African President Jacob Zuma denied any wrongdoing over a \$23 million state-funded security upgrade to his private home at his Nkandla home, on February 20, 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria announced the suspension of the country's Central Bank Governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi who publicly alleged that \$20 billion (£12bn) in oil revenue had gone missing

In Burkina Faso, a corruption survey identified the police as the most corrupt institution. In Senegal, a survey carried out by 'Forum Civil' identified the traffic police, customs officials and police as the most corrupt institutions.<sup>20</sup>

A similar survey in Ghana conducted by the Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana with the World Bank in 2000 revealed that most Ghanaians considered the Motor Traffic and Transport Unit (MTTU) of the Police Services, the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Regular Police and the Immigration Service as the most corrupt public institutions.<sup>21</sup>

Majority of the respondents said they have had to pay bribes to officials in these institutions on some occasions. Most Ghanaian businesses said they felt reluctant using the law courts to address conflict because of the prevalence of corruption in the judiciary (Atuobi, 2007).

The survey result blamed high level of corruption in Ghana on low salaries, culture of gift giving, absence of or weak corruption reporting system and poor internal management practices. Political corruption is also rampant. Most state officials – president, ministers, legislators, governors etc – see political offices as opportunity to make wealth.<sup>22</sup>

For instance, in September 2006, the Economic Crimes Commission of Nigeria charged 15 of the 36 states Governors of corruption. Most of them were suspected of stealing public funds and money laundering.<sup>23</sup> Currently Chief James Ibori a former Governor of Delta State in Nigeria is serving a jail term in the UK for corruption charges including embezzlement of public funds .

In a recent release, Transparency International's 2013 country wide rating placed two key institutions in Nigeria as the most corrupt namely; the police force and political parties.<sup>24</sup>

Despite recent efforts to clamp on corrupt public officers including the arrest and jail term for some ministers in 2007 by President Paul Biya, public corruption remains an issue in Cameroon.<sup>25</sup>

In 2007, a survey by the non-governmental organization

**Table 1.** Loot of some African heads of state.

President/head of state	Country	Amount looted \$
General Sani Abacha	Nigeria	\$20billion.
President H.Boigny	Ivory Coast	\$6 billion.
General Ibrahim Babangida	Nigeria	\$5billion.
President Mobutu	Zaire	\$4billion.
President Mouza Traore	Mali	\$2billion.
President Henri Bedie	Ivory Coast	\$300million
President Denis N'gnesso	Congo	\$200million
President Omar Bongo	Gabon	\$80million
President Paul Biya	Cameroon	\$70million
President Haite Mariam	Ethiopia	\$30million
President Hissene Habre	Chad	\$3million

Source: French Weekly (May, 1997), in Ayittey (2002).

German Technical Cooperation, GTZ, and the Cameroon business leaders union, GICAM, among others, showed that corruption is severely hampering economic progress.<sup>26</sup> Of over 1,000 business managers polled, 49 percent acknowledged paying bribes to dodge taxes, while 36 percent said they spent up to five percent of their profit bribing government officials to get public contracts and other advantage.<sup>27</sup>

On 24 April 2013, Rana Plaza – an eight-storey complex containing several clothing factories – collapsed in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Some 1,135 garment workers died and over 2,500 were injured in the biggest disaster the Bangladeshi garment industry has ever seen. The tragedy captured global attention with coverage routinely detailing the horrific working conditions employees were forced to endure, inspectors easily subverted by corruption and factories built on illegally occupied land.<sup>28</sup>

In Malawi, one of the biggest scandals in the country “the cash gate scandal” since 2013 involves an estimated US\$20 million to US\$100 million that has gone missing from government coffers. It became news last year immediately after Malawi’s budget director was shot under circumstances that still remain a mystery, and huge sums of cash in both local and foreign currency were found in the vehicles and homes of some civil servants, most of them low-ranking junior accountants.<sup>29</sup>

In Zambia, government nationalization of the copper mines and the installation of a one party state that lasted for 25 years should be considered mileposts on the Zambian road to ruin.<sup>30</sup> The Zambian’s democracy transition and election of Frederick Chiluba (1991–2001) exemplify the dangers inherent in superficial democratizations. During his time in office, this democratically elected leader of Zambians stole tens of millions of dollars. In 2008, a British court found that Chiluba conspired to steal \$40 million, while the Zambian Government claimed that it recovered \$60 million by freezing his assets at home and overseas.<sup>31</sup>

Ayittey (2002) presented the loot of some African

Heads of State, as shown in Table 1.

On the other hand, the greater challenge is perhaps the involvement of the Western institutions and government in corruption in Africa. “A famous post colonial description of the relations between France and Africa proposed that “France without Africa is like a car without petrol”. This strategy has continued to have practical consequences. For example, the successful rebellion that enabled President Sessou to seize power in Congo Brazaville was helped by substantial finance from ELF, which was followed by a generous concession awarded by President Sessou to ELF. Similarly by the time Laurent Kabila became president of DRC, he had reputedly already signed up \$500m of resource extraction contracts” (Collier, 2006). Even within Africa there are extreme asymmetries of power. President Kabila granted valuable concessions to President Mugabe and the army of Zimbabwe in order to buy what was in effect mercenary defense service (Ibid).

Equally, Nigeria has a strategic interest in Sao Tome where it has oil concession after resisting a coup attempt against President Fradique de Menezes on 16 July, 2003.

Collier (2006) observed that both at the global level and in Africa, the rule of law is fragile. Both international political economy and the political economy of Africa can therefore draw upon the new institutional economics of “lawlessness”.

The imminent danger posed by corruption in Africa however suggests the need to combine open deliberation of policy issues involving civil society groups with the constitutional right to challenge prevailing elite interests.

### **Conclusion: Africa in Search of Alternative Transformation Model**

This paper provides dynamics of corruption and development administration failures in Africa. Our analysis is guided by institutional theoretical framework and complemented by theoretical evidence. Democracy transition has not transformed corruption in Africa since the 1990s. Attaining to a developmental state status remains a far cry. This does not presuppose pessimism; rather Africa should rise and confront development failures.

Chinua Achebe observed that; “The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership” (Achebe, 1983). The forgone reveals that same could be said of contemporary Africa. The paper shows that there is strong evidence that most African states lack a clearly focused “development” orientation or ideology aimed at bringing their countries out of poverty. It draws from the experience of East Asian countries which pursued development ideologies and suggests that development administration practice should now be guided by certain ethical guidelines defined on the basis of social justice, transparency, accountability and equality in order for African states to transform to developmental states.

In the almost 40 years since Walter Rodney's seminal book; *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Rodney, 1972) launched the vast research programme on the dynamics of European imperialism and capitalist exploitation, there is hardly any long term transformation paradigm shift in Africa's development strategies. Although two democratic developmental African States namely; Botswana and Mauritius are seminal evidence that Africa could be transformed, the rest of Africa is yet to follow suit.

A trajectory which this study makes is that though corruption transformation in Africa is possible, it is at the moment riddled with uncertainties. Weak institutional structures, poor macroeconomic policies, poor leadership etc have made the clamour and quest for corruption amelioration paradoxical in Africa. The paper suggests radical overhaul of public administration.

Castells observed that a developmental state "establishes as its principles of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained development, understanding by development of the steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the international economy" (Castells, 1992).

Maundeni (2010) builds on Chalmers Johnson's "priority model" to explore the rise of developmental states in East Asia. Johnson's priority-based developmental state theory points out that it is important to consider state priorities in any developmental state research.

He starts his definition by categorizing the state as either developmental, or regulatory, or pursuing equality, or ideological, or military, or many others. Johnson (1982) says these states are explained by their priorities. He defines the developmental state as that which prioritizes economic development or pursues developmental nationalism (Ibid).

Self-reliant strategies are proposed as several scholars are aware that the international community are "ill equipped" for institutional overhaul of Africa.

Joseph observed, "The international financial agencies, which dominate economic policy and resource mobilization in Africa, are ill-equipped to play political midwife, while the diplomatic services of Western industrialized countries are seldom able to counter the strategies of incumbent regimes to adopt variations of the "Chinese model", market reforms accompanied by limited or deferred political liberalization" (Joseph, 1997).

We have explored an array of corrupt indices derailing institutional transformation and development administration. We suggest transparent, "statist nationalist" and "liberal economic" models as "priority" for Africa.

Influential economist Gunnar Myrdal, in this line of debate, demonstrated how two non-communist East Asian countries namely; India and Indonesia adopted a statist nationalist and liberal economic models respectively (Myrdal, 1968). Africa could pursue similar ideologies.

Johnson argued, "a state attempting to match the economic achievements of Japan must adopt the same priorities as Japan, it must pursue developmental nationalism. It must first of all be a developmental state – and only then a regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kind of functional state a society may wish to adopt" (Johnson, 1982). He argues that for fifty years the Japanese State has given its first priority to economic development. He further observed that post war Japan established a developmental state in which there was a clear focus on making the country rich (Ibid).

Developmental state debate shows that even countries with great potential for development such as abundant natural resources, without "developmental" orientation-accountability, transparency, sound macroeconomic policies etc will fail to achieve sustained economic progress; much of Africa falls within this category.

The 'institutional failure' diagnosis has led international engagement towards a focus on more pro poor approaches to Africa's development and corruption amelioration. The use of Corruption Risk Assessors (CRAs) and related institutional changes is important. The range of (external) policy instruments, of which EITI is but one, aimed as much at shifting the political equilibrium – though enforcing greater transparency and accountability on political elites in ways that promote choices that deliver 'developmental outcomes' in natural resource transfers has been minimal, evolving indigenous (internal) strategies as suggested is a viable option as corruption remains a development issue.

## Conflict of Interests

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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